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## NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN.

By R. P. LONGDEN.

### (Plate 1)

These notes are designed to supplement, rather than to supplant, existing accounts of the Parthian campaigns of Trajan. I have therefore not tried to include an account of such matters as did not seem to me to be essential for an understanding of the main course of events and which are adequately and picturesquely reproduced elsewhere. But it is not too much to say that the times, places and purposes of Trajan's campaigns are alike obscure. The evidence is, of course, fragmentary; it is scattered, and much of it is of inferior quality; but since the scope of general histories has not allowed their authors to present a detailed argument, their handling of these important campaigns has of necessity been somewhat cursory. There is thus some reason to look at the evidence again. The first of these notes reviews the difficulties of the chronology, and continues with a partial reconstruction of the sequence of the campaigns based on the chronology adopted. The second discusses the antecedents of the war and attempts to probe the causes which were at work both before and during the campaigns.

#### A. THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGNS.<sup>1</sup>

I. *The Chronology.* No one now doubts that Trajan left Rome in the autumn of 113. The entry of Suidas under the heading εἰσεποικήθη<sup>2</sup> gives some ground for supposing that he chose the 27th October, 113, the sixteenth anniversary of his adoption by Nerva, as the day of his official departure. The news that he was really coming had reached the Parthian court before he left; but the embassy of propitiation which Osroes despatched on its receipt was too late to stop him. It met him at Athens,<sup>3</sup> when it was clearly impossible to turn back, and no doubt its apprehensive humility only served to sharpen his zest for the enterprise. He crossed into

<sup>1</sup> In the notes to this article, the following abbreviations are used. *I.G.R.R.*=*Inscriptiones graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* (Paris, 1906—); *I.L.S.*=H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* (Berlin, 1892–1916); *I.L.Al.*=S. Gsell, *Inscriptiones latines de l'Algérie I* (Paris, 1922); Dio, Exc. Ug.=*Excerpta Ursiniana de legatis exterarum gentium ad Romanos*; Dio, Exc. Ur.=*Excerpta Ursiniana de legatis Rom. ad exteras gentes*.

<sup>2</sup> ἐνιαύσιος ἦν ἡμέρα, ἐν ᾗ Τραϊανὸς ἐπὶ διαδοχῇ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆς ὑπο τοῦ πατρὸς Νερῶνα εἰσεποικήθη, if Roos (*Studia Arrianea*, p. 32), followed by Jacoby (*F. Gr. Hist.* BD. 575), are right in referring this to Arrian's *Parthica*.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, Exc. Ug., 51.

Asia, probably to Ephesus, and proceeded overland, as Dio tells us, (it was winter) to Seleuceia<sup>1</sup> and thence to Antioch, which he reached in the New Year. Malalas, referring plainly to his first arrival, says that he entered the city on Thursday, January 7. This is not in itself an improbable date; but the fact that January 7, 114, was not in reality a Thursday is only one of the reasons why much reliance should not be placed on the accuracy of Malalas' account.

With the year 114, however, the chronological uncertainty begins. It is well known that Mommsen, dismissing too lightly the epigraphical evidence, post-dated the beginning of the war by a year.<sup>2</sup> His view that Trajan left Rome late in 114, conquered Armenia and Mesopotamia in 115 and took Ctesiphon in 116 is now generally abandoned.<sup>3</sup> But it has been abandoned by nearly all subsequent writers in favour of another error. Mommsen saw that the narrative of Xiphilinus describes only two aggressive campaigns on Trajan's part, divided by a winter which he spent at Antioch and during which there occurred the notorious earthquake of which Xiphilinus gives full details. Accepting Malalas' date for the earthquake, namely, Sunday, December 13, 115 (although December 13 was not a Sunday), Mommsen allowed himself to be led into over-riding the archaeological evidence. With one notable exception,<sup>4</sup> all subsequent writers squared Malalas' account with the archaeological evidence, as they conceived it, by throwing over Xiphilinus. This was made the easier by the condition in which the text of Dio was presented to them. For Boissvain and other editors leaven their text of Xiphilinus' abridgment with the extracts culled by order of Constantine Porphyrogenitus dealing with embassies and with outstanding feats of ἀρετή or of κακία. These *ipsissima verba* of Dio do indeed tell us a great deal of what we know about the campaigns: but they are on a different scale from the abridgment, and consequently care must be taken before considering the events they describe as of equal importance with those which Xiphilinus found regarded as the key to the affair.

The skeleton given by Xiphilinus runs somewhat as follows. 'After completing the Forum, Trajan made a war against the Armenians and Parthians on the pretext that the Armenian king had received his crown from the Parthian king and not from himself, but really through a desire for glory. When he invaded the enemy territory, the satraps and kings met him with gifts. But Trajan, ἀμαχεὶ πάντα χειρούμενος, came to Satala and to Elegeia, places in

<sup>1</sup> Dio, *l.c.* He must mean Seleuceia in Cilicia. Probably Trajan sailed from here to the Pierian Seleuceia, the port of Antioch. The diploma published in *A.J.A.* for 1926 concerns some seamen serving under Q. Marcius Turbo in the first half of 114, and it is there suggested that they may have formed part of a fleet which conveyed or escorted Trajan to Syria (*o.c.* pp. 418-421).

<sup>2</sup> Mommsen, *Provinces* (Eng. Trans., 1909), vol. ii, p. 66.

<sup>3</sup> It has found champions, e.g. G. A. Harrer in *Studies in the Roman Province of Syria*, p. 23: but the reasons which make it impossible are too well established to need repetition.

<sup>4</sup> Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, Part II, vol. II, pp. 413 ff.

Armenia, and rewarded the king of the Heniochi, but punished Parthamasiris, the king of the Armenians. When he had captured the whole country of Armenia and had received the homage of many kings, overawing, without a battle, those who disobeyed, the Senate voted him, with other honours, the title of *Optimus*. [*Here follows a description of his behaviour on the march.*] And when he had conquered Nisibis and Batnae he was called *Parthicus*; but he prided himself more on his title of *Optimus* than on any others, because it honoured his character. And while he was staying in Antioch there was a terrible earthquake. Other cities suffered, but Antioch more than them all. For, as Trajan was wintering there, a great crowd had gathered: thus in Antioch the whole world under Roman sway was stricken. [*Now comes a long description of the earthquake in the course of which Pedito the consul is mentioned as the most interesting victim—*ὦν εἷς καὶ ὁ Πέδων ὁ ὑπάρχων ἐγένετο· καὶ εὐθύς τε γὰρ ἀπέθανεν.] And Trajan, at the beginning of spring, hurried to the enemy's country. He crossed the Tigris, opposite the mountains of Gordyene, meeting some opposition, which he overcame by skilful use of the boats which he had brought in parts from Nisibis. These, appearing in a treeless land, disconcerted the enemy: and the Romans crossed over and gained possession of the whole of Adiabene and thereafter advanced as far as Babylon itself without any opposition at all; for the Parthian power had been destroyed by civil wars, which were still continuing. He hesitated about constructing a canal between the Euphrates and Tigris, but eventually decided to drag his flotilla across the narrow space between the rivers. Then he crossed the Tigris and entered Ctesiphon, whereupon he was saluted as *Imperator* and confirmed his title of *Parthicus*. After this he descended to the Persian Gulf, on the way winning over easily Mesene, the island in the Tigris of which Attambelus was king: but owing to a storm and the swiftness of the river and the tide coming in from the sea he was in serious danger. There he saw a ship sailing to India and said that only old age prevented him from following it. Meanwhile, all the conquered districts revolted and the garrisons which had been placed in them were expelled or annihilated. Trajan learnt of this at Babylon and sent Lusius and Maximus against the rebels. Maximus was killed but Lusius took Nisibis, also Edessa, which he sacked and burned. Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander took Seleucia. Trajan then, fearing the Parthians would make some fresh move, crowned Parthamaspatas at Ctesiphon. Then Trajan marched against Hatra.'

This brings us to the end of the campaigns; and on the view of Sills,<sup>1</sup> Henderson,<sup>2</sup> Paribeni,<sup>3</sup> and other writers we should have to

<sup>1</sup> *Trajan's Armenian and Parthian Wars* (Cambridge, 1897), pp. 77-104.

<sup>2</sup> *Five Roman Emperors* (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 318-330.

<sup>3</sup> *Optimus Princeps* (2 vols. Messina, 1926), ii, pp. 293-300.

suppose that what is described before the earthquake must be somehow divided so as to make two campaigns, while all that follows is compressed within the compass of a single year's campaigning. That such a division seems 'quite disproportionate to the relative difficulty and extent of the campaigns,' as Lightfoot said, is true; but he overestimated, I think, the difficulty of accounting for it.

However, unless Xiphilinus has made an error about an important point, the difficulties are removed here by abandoning Malalas' date for the earthquake.<sup>1</sup> This would probably have been done long ago but for the ingenuity of von Gutschmid, who remarked that while January 7, 114, was not a Thursday, nor December 13, 115, a Sunday, yet December 13, 115, was a Thursday and January 7, 115, a Sunday.<sup>2</sup> Malalas would not, of course, find the days of the week in his records, and it is assumed that he made the mistake in copying out the result of his calculations. This correction involves also the view that Malalas' first date, January 7, which seems plainly enough to record Trajan's first arrival in Antioch,<sup>3</sup> refers instead to his return after the Armenian campaign—a return delayed apparently until January, although the campaign was over by the middle of August at the very latest.<sup>4</sup> Those, however, who are prepared to accept these assumptions, or simply to suppose that Malalas correctly copied the year and month from the city records and added a weekday at random to give verisimilitude to his narrative, contrive to save some of Malalas' credit and retain his date for the earthquake. But Pedo the consul, says Xiphilinus, was one of the victims. Now M. Pedo Vergilianus was *cos. ord.* for 115 with L. Vipstanus Messalla; and we have dedications, e.g. *C.I.L.* vi, 43, of January 28, which name them together. But an inscription from Lanuvium giving the date viiii *Kal.*—month missing—names Messalla and Catilius Severus as consuls.<sup>5</sup> Pedo had therefore dropped out, and on Xiphilinus' evidence it is natural to suppose he had done so by death. The inscription must belong to the early part of the year because any inscription which named Messalla together with a *consul suffectus* must date from the time when Messalla was still actually in office. If, therefore, Xiphilinus is right in describing Pedo as ὁ ὑπατος we need look no further and can safely assign the earthquake to some day early in 115.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Malalas' evidence on the general history of the war is by most regarded as worthless (e.g. Mommsen *o.c.*, p. 69). But, as an Antiochene, his remarks about Antioch deserve closer attention: Sills says his date is 'probably derived from contemporary Antiochene annals.' He does not, however, seem to be any more trustworthy about Antiochene than about external history (cf. Lightfoot *o.c.*, pp. 437 ff. and see below pp. 29 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> In Dierauer's *Beiträge zu einer kritischen Geschichte Trajans*, p. 154, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> This suited Mommsen, who dated his arrival

in the East to 115: but it does not suit the tale of later historians who have rightly accepted the winter 113-4 for this event.

<sup>4</sup> See below, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.* 1911, p. 486. This man is L. Catilius Cn. f. Clau. Severus Iulianus Claudius Reginus, who was subsequently governor of Armenia with Cappadocia and was promoted to Syria by Hadrian.

<sup>6</sup> This date is accepted without more ado by Groag in *P.-W.* xiii, col. 1879.

It is nevertheless worth while facing the possibility that Dio or his copyist may be wrong. As *cos. ord.* for 115, Pedo would continue to be thought of as one of *the* consuls for the year, and the mistake might easily arise by which, if he died in December, 115, he might still be described as 'the consul.'<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, advisable to look at the other evidence, and first at Trajan's titles.

With one exception, inscriptions which are securely dated to 114 show the title *Imp. VII.* The Lower Pannonian diploma, *C.I.L.* iii, p. 869, proves that this salutation was officially recognised in Rome by September 1. The 8th salutation probably also belongs to this year. It exists only very doubtfully on two fragmentary inscriptions,<sup>2</sup> and on coins, some of which show also the title *Parthicus*. The 9th salutation, which occurs on coins and on two inscriptions of A.D. 115,<sup>3</sup> may, for all we know, belong to this year as well. Evidence about the 10th seems to be lacking, but three inscriptions record the 11th salutation, of which two belong certainly to 115,<sup>4</sup> while the third is not precisely dated.<sup>5</sup> Of these three, two have also the title *Parthicus*. There is no reason why the 12th salutation should not also have been added during this year, but it is first found on inscriptions of 116, and by September 8, 116, had been officially superseded by the 13th.<sup>6</sup>

Thus during 114 and 115 Trajan received certainly five and conceivably six new salutations, during 116 he received probably two but possibly only one, during 117 none. Now if the Ctesiphon campaign was delayed till 116, five (or six) salutations must have been won by successes before the earthquake; and we can only account for this by supposing that Dio or Xiphilinus has omitted to record the most important parts of the campaigns. And even so, though we cannot definitely say that any particular event was accompanied by a salutation, those which follow the earthquake seem positively to demand an allowance of more than two (or one).

Some attention must also be paid to the appearance of *Parthicus* among Trajan's titles. This, according to Xiphilinus, was given him after the capture of Batnae and Nisibis, i.e. during his Meso-

<sup>1</sup> A different objection has often been stated: e.g. by Sills (*o.c.* pp. 83-89), de la Berge (*Essai sur le règne de Trajan*. Paris, 1877), etc. 'Puisque Pedon était à Antioche, c'était qu'il n'était plus en fonction: pendant l'exercice de sa charge il ne pouvait quitter Rome' (de la Berge, *o.c.* p. 175 n.). This objection cannot stand. Setting aside other examples, we have evidence that all the generals during the Parthian wars whose names we know, except Trajan himself, Hadrian (who was consul in 118 without returning to Rome), and Appius Maximus Santra—who was not a success—held the consulship during this period: and there is little to recommend the view that they were sent home to hold it. The modern practice by which wars are largely directed from home affords no parallel. In no sense was Rome the headquarters

for the prosecution of the Parthian war. Rather was the headquarters of the Roman government where Trajan was. The consulship was bestowed by him as a reward for distinguished service.

<sup>2</sup> *C.I.L.* xiii, 6798; *I.L.Al.* 3978.

<sup>3</sup> *C.I.L.* ix, 5894; x, 6887.

<sup>4</sup> *C.I.L.* xi, 6622; ii, 5543.

<sup>5</sup> *I.G.R.R.* iv, 172.

<sup>6</sup> *C.I.L.* iii, p. 870. Cf. also iii, p. 2328<sup>67</sup> to Pannonian auxiliaries. *C.I.L.* iii, 7537, an official inscription of Tomi, reads TR.P. XXI, IMP. XII, which must be an error. It looks as if the provincial headquarters staff here were under a misapprehension and had supplied false information to the people of Tropaeum Traiani, if the new reading of *C.I.L.* iii, 12470 as TR.P. XXI, IMP. XII be correct.



potamian campaign: but he only confirmed it officially after the capture of Ctesiphon. The words of Xiphilinus most naturally bear this meaning, though ἐβεβαιώσατο *might* also mean 'confirmed' in the sense of 'justified.' Now if the earthquake be dated to the winter 114–5 we should expect to find the title *Parthicus* current but not official, i.e. irregularly, on inscriptions late in 114 and during the first half of 115, and on all inscriptions from the autumn of 115 onwards, that is to say, after the taking of Ctesiphon. This is, in fact, what we do find. The title appears on one inscription which is securely dated to 114, and also on coins with the inscription *Imp. VIII*.<sup>1</sup> It is missing on some inscriptions of 115, which would therefore belong to the first half of the year, but present in others.<sup>2</sup> On coins of Alexandria it seems to occur on rather more than half of those of the year 115–6.<sup>3</sup> The many coin-issues of Syrian towns of this principate which mostly begin with Trajan's arrival in the east show it almost universally.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, it is lacking on one inscription, accurately dated, on which it ought to occur. This is *I.G.R.R.* i, 1267, from Cysis in Upper Egypt, which belongs either to April or May, 116. This inscription is habitually quoted to show—against the evidence of the others—that the title *Parthicus* must belong to summer, 116. But it is worth noticing that it comes from Dush-el-Kalah, a remote place on the southern outskirts of the Khargeh oasis and far from the main stream of Roman communications. The evidence of its stone-cutters cannot, therefore, be regarded as paramount.<sup>5</sup> Moreover the activities of rabid Jews must at this time have considerably interfered with the dissemination of reliable news in Egypt generally.

If we could prove that the Jewish rebellion had broken out in 115, a reason would exist for thinking that Trajan would not, in spring, 116, set out on a difficult and prolonged campaign to Lower Mesopotamia leaving behind him this extremely dangerous and infectious revolt, still gathering strength and fury. If, however, he were already at Ctesiphon when news of it reached him, we can understand him adopting the policy which he did adopt, that of

<sup>1</sup> *C.I.L.* ii, 2097=*I.L.S.* 297. Cohen no. 177=Mattingly and Sydenham no. 322. Others with *Imp. VIII* and *VIII* lack the title: Mattingly and Sydenham nos. 655, 657=Cohen 176, 178.

<sup>2</sup> Of these *C.I.L.* ii, 5543 gives special emphasis by assigning it a line to itself.

<sup>3</sup> According to Vogt (*Alexandrinische Münzen*, i, 66) it also occurs on coins of 114–5. This is also the case with coins of Laodicea (*B.M.C. Galatia, etc.*, p. 253).

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Beroea, where there are eight successive issues (according to Wroth's interpretation of the coin-marks (*B.M.C. Galatia, etc.* li and 130–131), all of which show the title.

<sup>5</sup> The remoter parts of Egypt were often behind the times: cf. *I.G.R.R.* i, 1371, Wilcken, *Griech.-Ostr.*, pp. 799 ff. There are two papyri which are

also objectionable. But in *P. Ryl.* 191 the reading Δακικοῦ δθϋρ 4—i.e. omission of the title *Parthicus* on November 4, 115, is only conjectural: and in any case the papyrus was itself written in 117. In *P. Oxy.* 74, however, a registration of sheep and goats, the title *Parthicus* is lacking on January 27, 116. Papyri are, however, untrustworthy evidence, e.g. the title *Optimus* is missing in a declaration of municipal bakers of October 28, 116 (*P. Oxy.* 1454); and many such instances could be given. Inscriptions, of course, accidentally omit well-established titles from time to time: such omissions are *Dacicus* in *I.L.Al.* 236, *C.I.L.* ii, 4797 (where other milestones of the same series all have it); *Optimus* in *I.L.S.* 303 (which is full of errors), *I.L.Al.* 2829, 2989 (if the tribunician number is right).

sending Marcius Turbo with the fleet, the only mobile and available force which could be spared. However, the outbreak of the revolt cannot be certainly dated. Eusebius in his *Chronicle*, according to Jerome's version, puts the original outbreak in Trajan's seventeenth year, which, according to the reckoning established by Turner,<sup>1</sup> means for him September, 114—September, 115. We should not place great reliance on this by itself; but that Eusebius had acquired some firm chronological date from his source is shown by his also giving a fixed date in the *Ecclesiastical History*. In this case he gives the eighteenth year; but it is not unlikely that here he merely gives the date which he found, whereas in the *Chronicle* he had to bring the number of the year into line with his own chronological system. If this is so, the date which Eusebius recognised for the outbreak was the first part of 115 and the arguments set out above would apply to the case. Without outside support, however, Eusebius' date cannot be regarded as more than probable.<sup>2</sup>

There are still further arguments for the earlier date for the earthquake. I will give two. Dio,<sup>3</sup> describing Trajan's first interview with Abgarus, says 'Leaving garrisons at suitable places, Trajan came to Edessa.' Now, if the Armenian and Mesopotamian campaigns belong to the same year, Trajan is on his return journey and the garrisons—it follows naturally enough—will be those which he left in Armenia and further east in Mesopotamia. But, if the campaigns be divided, this must refer to the opening of his second campaign, and Dio apparently states that Trajan left garrisons at suitable places between the Roman frontier and Edessa, a straight road of some thirty miles, which seems a very curious and ultra-cautious proceeding. Secondly, coins were struck with the reverse legend 'Armenia et Mesopotamia in potestatem p. R. redactae';<sup>4</sup> and as no coins apparently were struck by the official mint to celebrate the conquest of Armenia, as would surely have been done if the first year had closed with this success, the simplest conclusion is that Armenia and Mesopotamia were reduced in the course of a single campaign. It will be seen in the sequel how naturally the narratives of Dio and Xiphilinus fit this interpretation.

This is the evidence which must either confirm or deny Xiphilinus' accuracy in describing Pedo as consul at the time of the earthquake. It appears to me that it abundantly confirms it; and that the earth shook at Antioch during the first weeks of 115.<sup>5</sup> A further problem now follows. Granted that Ctesiphon fell in 115, did the revolt also

<sup>1</sup> C. H. Turner in *Journ. Theol. Studies*, i, pp. 187–192.

<sup>2</sup> When, however, Eusebius gives an exact date in the *Ecclesiastical History* it is usually accurate by ordinary reckoning. Turner says 'Eusebius will be found to repeat in the *History* the exact dating of the *Chronicle* when, and only when, it was more than guess-work,' *l.c.* p. 199.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, Exc. Ug. 53.

<sup>4</sup> Cohen no. 39=Mattingly and Sydenham *The Roman Imperial Coinage* II, Trajan no. 642, where the legend-reference needs correcting.

<sup>5</sup> The news was not common property in Rome on January 28. *C.I.L.* vi, 43.



take place in that year? It is more likely that it did not. It is probable that Trajan received two new imperial salutations in 116, and if all the Mesopotamian campaigns were over it is difficult to find any reason to account for these. Xiphilinus' account does not actually repudiate a year of inactivity in 116, but he remarks that shortly after the siege of Hatra, which belongs to the revolt, Trajan began to fail in health; and this comes better in 116 than in 115. Moreover, King Abgarus of Osroene, who was retained in power in 114 but lost his throne and probably his life when Lusius Quietus sacked his capital, is said by Ps.-Dionysius of Telmahar to have ruled six years and nine months. The earliest date at which his reign can have begun seems to be October, 109:<sup>1</sup> if, then, Ps.-Dionysius is as accurate as he seems to be elsewhere in this regnal list, it would look as if Edessa was sacked in 116.<sup>2</sup> The career of Lusius Quietus presents a difficulty. At some uncertain date he was sent back to Mesopotamia. Trajan feared, says Eusebius, that the Jews there would rise against the other inhabitants. The version of Jerome puts this event in 116. It runs 'Iudaeis Mesopotamiae rebellantibus praecepit imperator Traianus Lysiae Quieto ut eos provincia exterminaret adversum quos Quietus aciem instruens infinita milia eorum interficit et ob hoc procurator (*sic*) Iudaeae ab imperatore decernitur.' This evidence is, however, not conclusive. Even if we accept it, there is still ample time for Lusius to have been sent back to Mesopotamia in the late autumn or winter of 116 and appointed governor of Judaea in the spring of 117. I therefore think that, while admitting that the evidence is defective, it is better to accept the chronology which explains the events most naturally, i.e. that Trajan spent the winter, 115-6, like Severus a hundred years later, in an advanced position on the lower Tigris, that the revolt broke out during that winter (or the spring of 116), was crushed before mid-summer,<sup>3</sup> that Trajan returned to Antioch during the summer of 116 and that Lusius' adventures among the Jews both of the Diaspora and of the homeland belong to the last few months of the principate.

2. *The first campaign.* In spring, 114, Trajan left Antioch for Armenia. Reading *Samosata* in Dio, Exc. Ug. 52, which says that he took it without a battle, Mommsen supposed that the legion XVI *Flavia firma* had lost this important bridgehead. But, in the first place, there is reason to think that this legion was stationed elsewhere before the Parthian war.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, and more to the point, whether there were troops there or not, who can have taken it? Abgarus of

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 13, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. von Gutschmid, *Mém. de l'acad. imp. de St. Petersbourg*, 1887, p. 18. One might also mention the storm on the Tigris (Xiph. 239), which if the revolt belongs to 115 must be put in the summer of that year. Such a phenomenon is not impossible in Mesopotamia in summer, witness the accident to the Chesney expedition on May 21, 1836; but, in

combination with a high tide, it seems to consort better with the autumn, when strong westerly winds blow and the river is low and therefore dangerous.

<sup>3</sup> Before August, at any rate. Cf. *C.I.L.* iii, p. 870.

<sup>4</sup> In Cappadocia: Suet. *Vesp.* 8. Probably at Melitene until 89 and thereafter perhaps at Satala.

Osrhocne, the local dependent king, whose levies would be called upon for the task, had sent an embassy to Trajan and was subsequently confirmed in his kingdom. Dio expressly says he was trying to be neutral. Is it likely that he would provoke reprisals in this way?<sup>1</sup> Von Gutschmid's emendation to *Arsamosata* seems therefore preferable.<sup>2</sup> It is mentioned by Pliny<sup>3</sup> as one of the four chief towns of Armenia, and stood just above the junction of the Peri Su and Murad Su,<sup>4</sup> near Kharpūt which had a Roman fort in 64.<sup>5</sup> But once at Arsamosata, Trajan would find himself shut out from northern Armenia by the most formidable of mountain barriers, to circumvent which it would be necessary either to return westwards to the Euphrates or to follow up the Pighi Su in a direction which would lead him straight to Elegeia. Possibly he concentrated his forces at Melitene, the chief Cappadocian camp, upon which he seems to have conferred some additional rights,<sup>6</sup> and there divided them into two columns; or southern Armenia may have been secured by planting a garrison in Arsamosata before an advance was made into the heart of the country.

However Trajan marched, he reached Satala at the end of spring. Here, probably, he met the Danubian reinforcements;<sup>7</sup> and here, too, he received the local kings.<sup>8</sup> He proceeded up the valley of the Frat Su, and at Elegeia, probably the modern Ilidja near Erzerum, he encountered Parthamasiris. On the high plateau of Erzerum, 6,000 feet above sea level, Trajan stood at the strategic centre of Armenia and near the lowest point on the main watershed between Euphrates and the rivers that drain into the Caspian. Parthamasiris was powerless to resist, and even had he cherished any idea of doing so he abandoned it in favour of a diplomatic method and an appeal to equity. The facts of the interview are well known. But Trajan answered crudely that he had determined to annex the country.<sup>9</sup> How far he was responsible for Parthamasiris' death is not absolutely certain. It has been urged that the entry in Suidas, *s.v.* γνῶσις, incriminates him, and that this is supported by the words of Fronto.

<sup>1</sup> Had Trajan been at Samosata a meeting would have been almost inevitable. But they do not meet until the end of 114. Mommsen supports his thesis by Fronto (ed. Naber pp. 206 f.), but this refers to L. Verus' campaigns. Samosata does not lie on any convenient route from Antioch to Melitene, which is the obvious headquarters for an invasion of Armenia and where Trajan did actually go.

<sup>2</sup> There is a hint that it may be right in the MSS., see Dio, ed. Boissevain, iii, 207.

<sup>3</sup> *N.H.* vi, 26.

<sup>4</sup> Anderson in *J.H.S.* xvii, 25.

<sup>5</sup> *I.L.S.* 232.

<sup>6</sup> Procopius *de Aedif.* iii, 4.

<sup>7</sup> Traces of their passage are found in *I.G.R.R.* iii, 173, from Ancyra, where Julius Severus is honoured for having received them.

<sup>8</sup> Dio—or Xiphilinus—singles out Anchialus, king of the Heniochi and Machelones, who was rewarded with gifts, what for we do not know—unless an answer can be supplied out of Suidas' entry about the Lazi, under the heading Διομετιανός or Jordanes, *Romana*, 267. The Lazi were neighbours of Anchialus. We learn besides of Julianus, king of the Apilae, and no doubt the contemporary rulers of all the other tribes that Arrian mentions in *Perip.* 11 also came: and Eutropius mentions the kings of the Albani, Iberi, Colchi, Bosporani and Sarmatae. The last two peoples although living on the north of the Black Sea may have been summoned to give pledges for their good behaviour during Trajan's absence on campaign. On Ardaches, see below, p. 17, n. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Parthamasiris had been summoned to Satala. For a discussion of his real position (see below, p. 25).

On the other hand, the extract of Suidas refers much more naturally to Parthamasiris' contemptuous dismissal, and Fronto's aim is to exalt Verus above Trajan, both as a soldier and as a man of honour. Paribeni<sup>1</sup> argues that, in preference to killing him at once, Trajan would have preferred to reserve him for his triumph, but he forgets that Trajan had already dismissed him, apparently for ever. The charge must be regarded as not proven.<sup>2</sup> After Parthamasiris' removal such chieftains as had not come to Satala made their obeisance;<sup>3</sup> and this part of the campaign seems to have been over at least before August.<sup>4</sup> Its events are also recorded on numerous coins with reverse legends *Imperator VII, Rex Parthus, Regna Adsignata* and others, including a coin attributed to the *κοινόν* of Crete bearing on its reverse *Ἀρμενία* and a crouching Armenian captive. The organisation of the new province was immediately undertaken. Two officials are known. L. Catilius Severus was governor of the provinces of Cappadocia and Armenia Major and Minor. He was consul in 115,<sup>5</sup> was certainly in Armenia in 116,<sup>6</sup> and perhaps in 117, until he was made governor of Syria by Hadrian. The other official is T. Haterius Nepos.<sup>7</sup> This man was subsequently prefect of Egypt and heard Memnon on February 18, 121,<sup>8</sup> probably soon after his arrival. But between his Armenian procuratorship and his prefecture, he had filled five other equestrian posts. Consequently, he must have been procurator in Armenia during the earliest period of reorganisation, if indeed he were not there while it was still a protectorate.

To the same period belongs the adventure of Lusius Quietus.

<sup>1</sup> *Optimus Princeps* ii, 293.

<sup>2</sup> Suidas s. v. *γνώσις*. Ἀρριανὸς ἐν Παρθικοῖς περὶ Παρθαμασίρου δὲ οὐχὶ Ἀξιδαρόν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἐαυτοῦ τὴν γνῶσιν, ὅτι πρῶτος παραβαλὼν τὰ ξυγκείμενα ἔτυχε τῆς δίκης. Fronto, ed. Naber, p. 209, cf. Suidas s. v. *Παραβαλὼν*.

<sup>3</sup> Xiphilinus 235.

<sup>4</sup> This is generally assumed to be proved by a combination of *C.I.L.* iii, p. 870, with Xiphilinus, 236. The first joins the titles *Optimus* and *Imp.* vii, on a diploma of Sept. 1, 114, while the second says that after Trajan had conquered the whole of Armenia the senate bestowed on him the title of *Optimus*. The epithet is first certainly applied to him by Pliny in the *Panegyric*, for its restoration in *I.G.R.R.* iii, 914, must be an error; and it is said not to appear on coin reverses before 104. Thereafter the word, generally in conjunction with *princeps*, is often applied to him, but not officially included in his titles until at least 114. Mr. Mattingly maintained in a lecture to the Roman Society that it was not official until 115: but this is not an essential deduction from the coin evidence, so far as I can see, and it is contradicted by that of all the inscriptions of 114. In fact, while Trajan did not have the title when he left Rome (*M. & S.* nos. 253, 4, 263, 633), if *M. & S.* no. 263a can be referred to the Athenian embassy (unless it is an error), the coin evidence would not prevent us fol-

lowing that of inscriptions in thinking it was officially assumed by Trajan in the New Year of 114. However, since, in addition, all coins of 113-4 and even a few of 114-5 of Alexandria lack the title, it is best to follow Xiphilinus. This leaves *A.J.A.* 1926, p. 418, a diploma with *Optimus* and *Imp.* vi, unexplained. Two even earlier inscriptions, *C.I.L.* iii, 15021 and *I.L.S.* 293, give the title wrongly; in the latter case Mommsen has an explanation which Dessau gives. Gsell's restoration in *I.L.Al.* 1230 does not seem to be a necessary one. Inscriptions are more prone to erroneous anticipation than coins; but when all the inscriptions of a year give a certain title the inference cannot be resisted. The coin evidence, as it is available at present, is a baffling ally in settling the chronology of the Parthian wars; much may be hoped from an advertised work by P. L. Strack which will deal with the subject. Meanwhile, J. Vogt's *Alexandrinische Münzen* is valuable. He notes (p. 92) that the subjugation of Armenia seems to be indicated by coin types of the year 113-4, i.e. before August 114—but types of this character may date from any time after the beginning of the invasion.

<sup>5</sup> See above, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Dio. Exc. Ur. 16.

<sup>7</sup> *I.L.S.* 1338.

<sup>8</sup> *C.I.L.* iii, 39.

This officer was sent with a column against the Mardi, who are supposed to have lived to the east of Lake Van.<sup>1</sup> Now, from Trajan's advanced camp at Erzerum it is indeed very plausible that a column should have been sent down the Pasin plain, along the Araxes valley and therefore into the country of the Mardi. Roman operations on this river were no novelty. Whether Lusius went further is more doubtful. Arrian, in the same book of the *Parthica* that related the conquest of Armenia, found occasion to mention the Caspian gates;<sup>2</sup> but this *may* have been in reference to one of the Parthian internal wars which Dio mentions. Meanwhile, Trajan himself descended into Mesopotamia, whether by the Bitlis pass or by one of the easier ones further west, which descend to Diarbekir. He now occupied Nisibis. This town, though not a part of Adiabene proper, very likely belonged to the territory allotted to the king of Adiabene, who was at this time Mebarsapes.<sup>3</sup> Mebarsapes and his vassal Mannus had already had a brush with the Romans, according to Dio; this was probably with the column of Lusius Quietus or some other occupied in settling the south-eastern districts of Armenia and coercing wavering chieftains. It is difficult to see how else a king of Adiabene could have come into conflict with Roman troops. Lusius Quietus occupied Singara and some other places without a battle.<sup>4</sup> Mebarsapes, finding himself unsupported by Osroes, was forced to retire into Adiabene beyond Tigris, and there he had to be left.<sup>5</sup> Winter was now approaching and Trajan decided to return to Antioch. On his way back he entered Edessa and there met Abgarus for the first time.<sup>6</sup> Abgarus contrived not only to keep his throne but to be responsible for the expedition which was sent against Sporaces, the neighbouring ruler of Anthemusia. Sporaces fled, and his territory was annexed.<sup>7</sup> These events closed the year's campaigning. The troops had marched a long way, but seen little fighting. The Great King had apparently made no move, and his vassals

<sup>1</sup> Themistius, *Or.* XVI. Cf. Suidas *s.v.* ἀμφίβολοι.

<sup>2</sup> Joh. Lydus, *De Mag.* iii, 53. Jacoby (*F. Gr. Hist.* BD. p. 575) follows Roës in tracing activity of Trajan in the Caucasus in this passage. If so, we might have an explanation of his boast to have gone further than Alexander.

<sup>3</sup> Pliny reckons it a part of Adiabene; *N.H.* vi, 42. Moreover, both Singara and Adenystrae are said by Dio to be in Adiabene; which may even at this time have marched with Osrhoene. The territory of Mannus, who was the vassal of Mebarsapes and the neighbour of Abgarus, probably lay on the border. Nine kings of Osrhoene were apparently called 'Mannus,' including him who succeeded Parthamaspatēs there in 123. Both this man and Abgarus were sons of an Izates, and this name also occurs in the royal family of Adiabene at a slightly earlier period.

<sup>4</sup> See *Syria*, 1927, p. 53, for a milestone of Trajan from the Djebel Sinjar, showing that the normal

Roman development of the new provinces was begun immediately.

<sup>5</sup> Dio, Exc. Ug. 54. Exc. Ur. 15 also belongs to this year. Sentius had been sent to Adenystrae as an envoy to Mebarsapes, who imprisoned him. He had been sent from Armenia probably to announce Trajan's approach, and in due course contrived to deliver the town over to the Romans. Adenystrae has been identified by Hoffmann (*Z.D.M.G.* xxxii, 741) with the medieval Dunaisir near Mardin, some 50 miles W. of Nisibis.

<sup>6</sup> Exc. Ug. 53. Details are given here and in the extracts of Suidas *s.v.* ἀκρα, ἐλλόβια, "Εδεσσα, φυλάρχης. It is possible that Trajan himself went from Armenia to Osrhoene and thence to Nisibis, if the order of the extracts represents the right chronology.

<sup>7</sup> Suidas *s.v.* στόλος, ὑψηγήσονται. Eutropius, viii, 3.

continued to hedge as long as they dared. Finally, they either abandoned their thrones or made what terms they could.<sup>1</sup>

3. *The Parthian dissensions.* In Arrian's tenth book occurred the passage καὶ βασιλεὺς δὲ ἐξελαύνει ἐκ Σελευκειᾶς οὐ πρόσω τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ Τίγρητος ἐς κώμην, ἧτινι Χωχὴ ὄνομα.<sup>2</sup> Now the tenth book of the *Parthica* ought to have described events of A.D. 114.<sup>3</sup> But we cannot take Trajan so far this year, and the passage must refer to an advance of Osroes, presumably against some local defiance of his authority. Such independence was not confined to one locality alone. There was Manisarus, who was expecting a campaign from Osroes. There was perhaps trouble in Media, if any inference can be based on Arrian's reference, already quoted, to the Caspian gates. During the whole of this period, if coins are to be trusted, there was a rival king, Vologeses, though his stronghold is not absolutely determinable.<sup>4</sup> There seems, again on coin evidence, to have been a revolt from the central authority as near home as Elymais.<sup>5</sup> If Attambelus, the king of the very important district of Characene, was not actually in rebellion, at any rate he welcomed Trajan and remained loyal during the revolt. In Persis a new dynasty begins coining at this time, the royal name being apparently Manuscithr.<sup>6</sup>

These chaotic conditions followed the death of Pacorus II. The coins of this monarch cease in 95 and Osroes' reign is reckoned sometimes from that year.<sup>7</sup> But this cannot be right unless the two monarchs, who were brothers, reigned contemporaneously. The slave sent by Decebalus to Pacorus was probably captured in 101 when his master, Laberius Maximus, was governor of Lower Moesia. Further, there is the important entry of Suidas under the heading ἐπικλήμα. ὁ δὲ Πάκορος ὁ Παρθυαίων βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐπικλήματα ἐπέφερε Τραιανῷ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ τῷ δοκεῖν ἐπικλήμα ἐποιεῖτο κατὰ Ῥωμαίων, ὅτι δόξαν ἐντὸς λ' ἡμερῶν μηδετέρους τι πλεονάζοντα τὰ συγκαίμενα ἐπιτελεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ θεοπροπίαν ἐπιτελεῖσθαι. To what does this refer? It cannot be glossed over as mere 'evidence of unrest': it describes a condition of

<sup>1</sup> Manisarus, who, when Trajan entered Mesopotamia, sent him encouraging messages from a locality where he was making trouble, is hard to account for. He has been supposed (by von Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans und seiner Nachbarländer* (Tübingen, 1888), p. 143) to be the ruler of Carduene (cf. Eutropius *l.c.*), but if Osroes was making a campaign against him this is unlikely.

<sup>2</sup> Steph. Byz. s. Χωχὴ.

<sup>3</sup> The only absolutely fixed points are Elegeia in 114, 8th book, and Hatra in 116, 17th book. But the chronological arrangement here adopted enables the books to be divided among the campaigns very plausibly. Thus, 8, 9, 10, and possibly 11, belong to 114. 12, which perhaps began with the earthquake, 13, which certainly described the conquest of Adiabene beyond Tigris, 14 and 15

belong to 115. In 16 came an account of Trajan's journey to the Persian Gulf, and probably the story of the revolt was begun here and concluded in the 17th book. Roos, however, *o.c.* p. 56, thinks that the mention of a town in Mesene in Book 16 must refer to some unknown event during the revolt; and that Trajan's known visit to the Persian Gulf must have been described in an earlier book.

<sup>4</sup> *B.M.C. Parthia*, pp. 209-214. Vologesias is suggested, but in that case we should expect him to be more prominent.

<sup>5</sup> *B.M.C. Arabia, etc.*, p. cxcii, and references there.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* p. clxxx ff. They must not be confused with Manisarus.

<sup>7</sup> e.g. *Ibid.* p. cxc.



war. Does it refer to trouble after the annexation of Arabia, an event which must have been noted with some distaste at Ctesiphon? But if so, where did the armies meet? Did Trajan tighten the Roman hold over Palmyra, which Pliny describes as a bone of contention between the two empires? But, if he did so, he did it through legates so far as we know, and this passage seems to require his presence. Perhaps it is best to suppose τῷ βασιλεῖ to be an ignorant gloss and to refer it to the known trouble when Trajan's father was governor of Syria in 76 or 77. We seem, however, to hear of Pacorus surviving in 109, if it was in that year that he sold the kingdom of Osrhoene to Abgarus VII.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it is in 110 that coins of Osroes first certainly appear, so that we may provisionally put his accession then.<sup>2</sup> Now he was a brother of Pacorus, whereas Parthamasiris and Axidares were sons. Since the appointment of Axidares was apparently accepted by Trajan, he must have been the second son, to whom the Armenian nomination would rightfully belong. From the excerpts of Arrian preserved in Suidas it appears that Axidares had indeed been the recognised ruler in Armenia and that even after Trajan's arrival he was still regarded at first as an influential person. Conceivably he himself appealed to Rome, but we have absolutely no proof of this.<sup>3</sup> As for Parthamasiris, there was very likely a party which supported his claim to the great kingship as Pacorus' eldest son. Osroes, therefore, tried to compensate him with the throne of Armenia but, quite apart from Trajan's intervention, the attempt does not seem to have been an unqualified success.<sup>4</sup> These disputes were no doubt responsible for the restlessness shown by subordinate rulers all over the empire. Those nearest the Romans, only guessing at Trajan's intentions, doubted whether it would not be wise to conciliate the invaders. Abgarus was one of those who hesitated. Mebarsapes apparently remained loyal and disappears from history. We do not know whether he subsequently recovered his kingdom.

4. *The Second Campaign.* In the spring of 115 Trajan proceeded to Adiabene. The point at which he crossed the Tigris (by a bridge of boats which had been built in parts at Nisibis during the winter) cannot be certainly determined. Xiphilinus says that it was opposite τὸ Καεδύηνον ὄρος.<sup>5</sup> His crossing is described as ἐπιπονώτατος owing to opposition from the other bank, probably further resistance by the faithful Mebarsapes. This was, however, overcome, and the whole of Adiabene conquered and formed into a

<sup>1</sup> The *Acts of Sbarbil* in Cureton, *Ancient Syriac Documents*, p. 41, synchronise Sept. 4, 112 with the third year of Abgar and the fifteenth of Trajan. Cf. von Gutschmid, *Mém. de l'Acad. des Sciences de St. Petersburg*, VIIe série, xxxv, p. 17, cf. pp. 25-28. p. 17. Suidas s.v. ὠνητή· καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐπιτρέπειν Τραϊανῷ Ἀβγαρον, καίπερ ἄρτι ὠνητὴν ἐκ Πακόρου ἔχει λαβὼν πολλῶν χρημάτων· καὶ τοῦτο ἀσμένῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ γίνεσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> *B.M.C. Parthia*, p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 25, where the question is more fully treated.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Suidas s.v. εὐθείαν.

<sup>5</sup> The actual place is not to be identified. Perhaps Za-feran (Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, p. 296). The later important trade route crossed lower down at Wanna. He may simply have followed Alexander's route as far as that was known.



new province with the title Assyria. Trajan held a review of his successful troops at Ozogardana;<sup>1</sup> and the tribunal from which he addressed them was exhibited to Ammianus Marcellinus.<sup>2</sup> He then descended into Babylonia. The subsequent operations which ended in the fall of Ctesiphon are obscure. Xiphilinus wrote καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ μέχρι τῆς Βαβυλῶνος αὐτῆς ἐχώρησαν κατὰ πολλὴν τῶν κωλυσόντων αὐτοῦς ἐρημίαν, which is often taken<sup>3</sup> to imply that Trajan, according to Dio, went from Adiabene to Babylon and thence back on his tracks to Ctesiphon, and it is assumed that this is absurd. But it is not stated by Xiphilinus that Trajan himself went to Babylon at this time: in fact, a little later in the narrative it is implied that he did not.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, there was a very sound reason for Trajan returning to the Euphrates, namely, to assume control of the force which had descended that river and to see how best to reunite it with his own troops. Henderson ignores the existence of this second army; but it is reasonably well attested: first, by the mention in Arrian's thirteenth book, which describes the operations of this year, of the satrapy of Chazene by the Euphrates and by two earlier references to places on this river; secondly, by the size of the ships which he appears to have used in his later operations; and thirdly, by the fact that not only was such a plan a favourite one with Trajan, but that it was in the circumstances a very natural and almost inevitable one to adopt, and one pursued by later invaders who followed in Trajan's track.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the one certain thing which Xiphilinus' very imperfect account of these events implies is that the problem was how to transfer a fleet from Euphrates to Tigris: but if there was no Euphrates fleet this problem could not have arisen. However, the exact tactics which brought about the sudden fall of Ctesiphon are uncertain. That it was unexpected by Osroes is shown by the fact that he had not at an earlier stage taken the precaution of removing his court and his treasure to a safer place. As it was, he fled precipitately, leaving behind his daughter and his golden throne, and Trajan entered the Parthian capital in triumph in his imperial galley.<sup>6</sup> From the narrative as we have it, it appears that it was easier to capture Ctesiphon than to cross the upper Tigris. Yet the city should have been capable of a strong defence, and Osroes clearly had it in mind to defend it. One thinks of treachery; and

<sup>1</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv, 2. Cohen no. 178 (=Matt-ingly and Sydenham no. 657) may celebrate this, as the latter editors affirm. Zosimus iii, 15 has Zaragardia.

<sup>2</sup> He also visited the Ἡφαίστου νῆσοι, the bitumen sources for the walls of Babylon, and the modern Kirkuk (Arrian, *Parthica*, 13, from Steph. Byz. s.v.).

<sup>3</sup> E.g. by Henderson, *o.c.* pp. 327-9.

<sup>4</sup> Xiphilinus, 240, (following Tillemont's correction to Βαβυλῶνι, adopted by Boisservain) the sense of which passage is certain.

<sup>5</sup> Steph. Byz. s.v. Χαζήνη, Φάλαγα, Νάαρδα. de la Berge, *Trajan*, pp. 172-3. *I.L.S.* 9471, ἐπιμελητῇ εὐθηνίας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ Παρθικῷ τῆς δαχῆς τοῦ Εὐφράτου. The 'praef. ripae fluminis Euphratis' of *I.L.S.* 2709 belongs perhaps to this period; but it is impossible to tell what his office was. Cf. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* BD. pp. 576-7; he quotes other extracts from Arrian which doubtfully refer to the Euphrates force.

<sup>6</sup> Suidas s.v. ναῦς.

it may be that Parthamaspatēs was the betrayer, or figurehead of the traitors.<sup>1</sup>

5. *The Persian Gulf.* In the brief narrative of this part of the expedition, which brought Trajan to within measurable distance of India, there is little matter for controversy.<sup>2</sup> Arrian's sixteenth book described it. The king, Attambelos, of whom Dio says that he remained faithful to Trajan though ordered to pay tribute, was apparently the fifth of this name and succeeded Theonesios III not earlier than III.<sup>3</sup> Jordanes says a statue to Trajan was erected on the shores of the Gulf.<sup>4</sup> That he established a fleet there, however, as Mr. Warmington thinks,<sup>5</sup> seems very unlikely. According to Eutropius 'Arabiam in formam provinciae redegit. In mari rubro classem instituit ut per eam Indiae fines vastaret.' It has been said<sup>6</sup> that Eutropius made this up out of Dio's tale about the ship that Trajan saw at Charax Spasinu sailing to India. But it seems more likely that *mare rubrum* means the Red Sea and that the fleet was put there, as Eutropius implies, when the Nabataean kingdom was annexed.<sup>7</sup>

6. *The Revolt.* From Characene Trajan apparently went to Babylon for the first time, and while there he heard that all the conquered districts—πάντα τὰ ἐαλωκότα—had revolted and had either expelled or massacred their garrisons.

The records of the revolt are both so inadequate and so garbled that any attempts to reconstruct what happened must be insecure. But it is worth while seeing where their evidence agrees and how much of it is at least possibly true. First, we know of three armies despatched by Trajan, one under Lusius Quietus, one under Maximus and one under Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander. The relative importance and the objectives of these three armies can also be tolerably well determined. Maximus was a consular, as were none of the others, and it may reasonably be assumed that his army was the most important and that its objective was to confront the chief peril. Lusius was sent into northern Mesopotamia, where he successfully reduced Nisibis and burnt Edessa and restored the whole district to obedience (ἄλλα τε κατώρθωσε). Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander took Seleucia, and burnt it. Whether this was Seleucia on the Tigris has been doubted in recent years, notably by Streck.<sup>8</sup> Henderson says bluntly 'Quite obviously *not* the Seleucia opposite Ctesiphon.'<sup>9</sup> That Streck and Henderson are mistaken is, I think, sufficiently demonstrated by the following considerations. Their view

<sup>1</sup> But it must be admitted that Malalas xi, 274 is against this.

<sup>2</sup> For a reference to the season of the storm see above, p. 8, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *B.M.C. Arabia*, etc., p. cciii.

<sup>4</sup> Jordanes, *Romana* 268.

<sup>5</sup> E. H. Warmington, *Commerce between the Roman Empire and India*, p. 96.

<sup>6</sup> Henderson, *o.c.* p. 330.

<sup>7</sup> See below, p. 26, n. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Art. 'Seleucia' in P.-W. Cf. his list of authorities on either side.

<sup>9</sup> *o.c.* p. 331.

is based on the belief that the revolt was confined to northern Mesopotamia. But Dio expressly says that all the conquered places revolted, indicating at least that the revolt was not concentrated in one district only. Furthermore, he states as if it was an exception that Attambelus remained loyal in Mesene, and this permits a reasonable inference that there were rebels not so remote from him as northern Mesopotamia. That Seleuceia on the Euphrates (= Zeugma<sup>1</sup>) was technically a part of Syria is perhaps a weak objection; but that it should have required the united efforts of two legions to capture what Groag dismisses as an 'unbedeutende Festung,'<sup>2</sup> and that the capture should win the consulship for their legates and be selected as a turning point in the history of the revolt seems to be a hypothesis unnecessarily hostile to the susceptibilities of common sense.<sup>3</sup>

These two, then, by taking Seleuceia on the Tigris, maintained the recent conquests, and the fall of Nisibis and Edessa would ensure a collapse of the insurgents in that part of the country. Meanwhile, who was Maximus and who were his opponents? The general cannot be certainly identified. Hauler<sup>4</sup> reads the passage in Fronto (p. 209 Naber) 'Appius vero quum praesens Traianus Euphrati et Tigridis portoria equorum et camelorum tribularet retro ab Arbace caesus est.' Beside *Appius* (which is written above the line) he reads *Santra* and thinks there is even room for *Maximus* to have stood between the two. The man's name would thus be Appius Maximus Santra, and Dessau, von Rohden and others identify him with the Appius Maximus Norbanus who crushed Saturninus' rebellion in 88-9.<sup>5</sup> Who he was, however, does not much affect the history of the revolt: it is more important to turn to his opponents. Hauler reads, over *retro*, *ad Balcia Tauri*; and over *Arbaces* (or possibly *Arsaces*) the letters *atu* or *alatu*. These indications, he would like to think, point to a reference to Sanatruces. The spur to this suggestion is provided by the account in Malalas. Malalas knows nothing of Maximus or, indeed, of any part of Dio's narrative, but brings Trajan straight away from Antioch to face Sanatruces the Persian King and his ἐξάδελφος Parthamaspatēs. Trajan seduces Parthamaspatēs, who deserts. Sanatruces is defeated and killed.

<sup>1</sup> Henderson's map is at fault here.

<sup>2</sup> P.-W. VI, col. 553.

<sup>3</sup> Dio describes them as ὑποστράτηγοι, that is to say legionary legates. What the rank of Lusius was at this time remains not very clear. At some time before the end of 116 he was *adlectus inter praetorios* and perhaps consul before the end of that year also. Groag (P.-W. XIII, col. 1882) thinks that the words of Dio (Exc. Val. 290) imply an *adlectio* only after his successes in this year, though he admits that the analogy of Maximus suggests that Lusius was already a senator. We do not know in the least how close the parallel was; still the most natural thing is to suppose that for his performances in 114, which cannot have gone unre-

warded, Lusius received the honour of *adlectio* and that his victories in 116 won him the consulship, as those of Erucius and Julius did for them.

<sup>4</sup> *Wiener Studien* xxxviii, 167.

<sup>5</sup> If this man was legate in Lower Germany in 88, he might seem a trifle elderly to cope with the emergencies of 116. Pichlmayr (*Hermes* xxxiii, 667) declared, on the evidence of Aur. Vict. *Ep.* 11, 10, that Norbanus' name was A. Lappius. The difficulties involved in this led Groag (P.-W. Suppl. I, col. 112) to christen him L. Appius Norbanus Lappius Maximus. The final addition of Santra by Hauler apparently caused him (*ap. Hauler*, p. 170) to suggest that the Parthian victim might have been a son of the loyalist of 88.

Parthamaspatēs, son of Osroes, is crowned king.<sup>1</sup> The last statement is correct, and Malalas follows it up by the comment that the excellent chronographer Ἀρειανός has composed an accurate history of the whole war. If this be a reference to Arrian's *Parthica*, the passage which precedes it deserves attention. Now, according to Dio,<sup>2</sup> at this time one Vologaesius, son of Sanatruces, drew up his forces against those of Severus; but an armistice having been agreed to, peace was secured by granting him a part of Armenia. This Severus was plainly L. Catilius Severus, whom we already know to have been governor of Armenia at this time,<sup>3</sup> and the occasion for buying off Vologaesius may well have been the receipt of news about the disaster to the army under Maximus. If Hauler's reading can be trusted, this took place *ad Balcia Tauri*, which he says means the eastern continuation of the Taurus range, and suggests that the Parthian army descended by the modern pass from Bitlis. This, of course, is mere conjecture; but it may be admitted that it would agree well with the facts we possess. Identifying Sanatruces with the Arsaces of Fronto,<sup>4</sup> we might suppose that the Parthian forces were concentrated for counter attack in Media, the strongest province not yet assailed; that an inroad was made by the main army under Sanatruces into northern Adiabene, probably in any case the most vulnerable point in the new Roman provinces; that simultaneously, a subordinate force under Vologaesius was launched against Armenia, while, as for the rising within the Roman provinces, its very ubiquity seems to be an indication that it was preconcerted. We have, moreover, further references to both Sanatruces and Vologaesius. Suidas has the following entry: Σανατρούκης Ἀρμενίων βασιλεὺς, δς τὸ μὲν σῶμα ξύμμετρον εἶχε, τὴν γνώμην δὲ μέγας ἐτύγχανεν εἰς ἅπαντα, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ εἰς τὰ ἔργα τὰ πολέμια. ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου φύλαξ ἀκριβῆς γενέσθαι, καὶ τὰ εἰς τὴν δαίταν ἴσα καὶ τοῖς κρατίστοις Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Ῥωμαίων κεκολασμένος, while Dio, Exc. Ur. 17, describes how the invading Alans, about 134, were checked by gifts from Vologaesius and by fear of Flavius Arrianus, the governor of Cappadocia. It is to be presumed that, when Hadrian withdrew the Roman administration from Armenia, it was Vologaesius, whose claims had already been recognised in 116, who received the territory which had still remained in Roman occupation. If Suidas' excerpt comes, as Boissevain thinks,<sup>5</sup> from Arrian, the description of Sanatruces as Ἀρμενίων βασιλεὺς is noteworthy. It is possible that in Sanatruces we have yet another

<sup>1</sup> Malalas XI, p. 273-4.

<sup>2</sup> Exc. Ur. 16, correctly placed by Boissevain.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Hauler (*o.c.* p. 173) has an alternative identification with Ardaches, whom the history of Armenia ascribed to Moses of Chorene described as the King of Armenia in this period. The identification cannot be supported, if for no other reason, because

the history says that, having rebelled against Domitian and beaten his soldiers (cf. above, p. 9, n. 8), Ardaches came to Trajan, paid his dues, and remained tributary and undisturbed under both him and his successor. We have here no more than the tale of some petty monarch among those summoned to Satrapa, the record of whose affairs the historian has magnified into a history of the whole of Armenia.

<sup>5</sup> Boissevain, vol. iii, p. 219.

brother of Parthamasiris and Axidares,<sup>1</sup> who would become the Parthian claimant to the Armenian throne on the former's death. The complimentary terms which Arrian uses to describe this enemy of the Romans may be partly accounted for if it be remembered that Sanatruces was the father of Arrian's own neighbour and ally in Cappadocia. Finally, is the proper conclusion from Malalas' account that, after the defeat of Maximus, Trajan himself took the field against the Parthians and that he was in command in person when Sanatruces was defeated and killed? About this, nothing can be settled. It seems intrinsically likely, though Groag supposes<sup>2</sup> that here, as elsewhere, we have traces of a confusion in the Oriental records between Trajan and Lusius. Equally uncertain must remain the occasion on which Trajan crowned Parthaspates. But that he had restored order in the conquered lands before he did so is made clear enough by the fact that Parthaspates managed to retain his throne even after Trajan's death without military support. Spartianus writes merely that Hadrian 'quod eum non magni ponderis apud Parthos videret, proximis gentibus dedit regem.'<sup>3</sup>

There is thus some evidence to confirm the few facts which Malalas seems to have drawn—at second or third hand most probably—from Arrian: it is otherwise, however, with the much longer tale, for which he shelves the responsibility on to Domninus, an authority himself of very questionable merit. Von Gutschmid, indeed, tried to work them into the narrative; and the result caused Mommsen to jettison the whole of Malalas' account. 'As this report stands, the historian can only decline to accept it; he cannot rectify it.'<sup>4</sup> This is indeed true of the account of Domninus. He does certainly introduce some recognisable names. Parthaspates is, correctly, the son of Osroes; but Osroes is King of Armenia. He sends Parthaspates to help his nephew, Sanatruces, whose father, Meerdotes (Osroes' brother), has died of a fall from his horse while invading the Roman country of Euphratesia. Antioch, when Trajan reaches Syria, is in the hands of the Persians.<sup>5</sup> This Meerdotes has been variously identified. Von Gutschmid gave him a crown in Armenia and identified him with a Mithradates IV, whose coins are known and used, on the grounds of this identification only, to be dated to about 116.<sup>6</sup> Wroth, however, showed good reasons for dating these coins about 130–147; so the pretended identity must be given up.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A cousin of Parthaspates, Mal. xi, 273.

<sup>2</sup> P.-W. xiii, col. 1880. It may, however, be observed that, if Malalas copied from Arrian, his authority is of a different character from those quoted in col. 1884. Von Gutschmid was the first to make Lusius Sanatruces' conqueror.

<sup>3</sup> S.H.A. *Hadrian* 5. 3. But cp. Dio, lxxviii, 33, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Provinces* (Eng. Trans.) II, p. 69.

<sup>5</sup> Malalas XI, 270–273.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. by Longpérier *Mémoire sur la chronographie des rois Parthes*, p. 141; Gardner, *The Parthian Coinage*, p. 55.

<sup>7</sup> Hill, however, (*B.M.C. Arabia, etc.* p. clxxix) seems to prefer von Gutschmid's authority to that of Wroth and to identify Mithradates with an otherwise unknown king who appears on a coin of Persis of about this date and whose name is read as MTRDT. How a king of Persis is found invading Syria is not explained.

The most that can be said for Meerdotes at present is that Parthian princes with similar names did from time to time exist, and that we have no means of proving that the father of the historical personage Sanatruces was not one of them.<sup>1</sup> As to his exploits, they can only be accepted by throwing over Dio : it is scarcely possible for the two narratives to be satisfactorily reconciled.

The last event recorded by Dio, the failure to take Hatra, raises no problems. The assault was perhaps responsible for Fronto's remark 'principis ad triumphum decedentis haudquaquam secura nec incruenta regressio.' Hatra was not taken; and while it was perhaps the object of Trajan's intended campaign in 117,<sup>2</sup> the continued resistance of this isolated desert stronghold cannot, after the decisive restoration of order elsewhere, have seriously menaced the peace of the province.

#### B. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR, AND THE MOTIVES OF TRAJAN.

The aims of Trajan in invading the Parthian empire cannot be completely discussed in isolation from the previous events of his principate : and those who believe that the prime cause of the war was the emperor's megalomaniac delusions, aggravated by the effects of self-indulgent excess, may for the present be left to the pleasures of their own imagination. The first part of this note scrutinises the attempt which has been made to find evidence for the Parthian wars in the Bithynian correspondence of Pliny : in the second and third I have tried to outline a coherent interpretation of the whole affair.

1. *The Bithynian Letters*. If Trajan had planned the war beforehand, it is natural to look for evidence of this. Many writers have vaguely declared that the coming hostilities are foreshadowed in Pliny's letters from Bithynia. This would be very important if it could be substantiated, and it is as well to look closely into the matter. A thorough investigation has been made by Professor Cuntz, who thinks that the evidence he finds enables him to say definitely that Trajan had already planned his Parthian war in A.D. 111.<sup>3</sup> His arguments are worth examining.

(i) *Epp.* xxvii, xxviii. These letters discuss how many soldiers (3 or 6) Maximus, a freedman procurator, should have under his command. Pliny allows him five, 'praesertim cum ad frumentum comparandum iret in Paphlagoniam.' This must refer, says Dr. Cuntz, to some extraordinary collection : obviously, it was designed to feed the numerous troops passing through on their way to Armenia, for whom the normal *annona* of the province would not suffice. As the letter belongs to 111, he infers that Trajan hoped to begin the

<sup>1</sup> There are genealogical discrepancies between Malalas' two stories.

<sup>2</sup> Dio, lxxviii, 33, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Hermes* lxi (1926), pp. 192-202.



war earlier than 114; but, in any case, the corn could be kept in the provincial granaries and would be there when it was wanted. These deductions might be justified with the help of further evidence; but this is also consistent with a routine event, of which the only unusual feature was the prominence of Maximus. Trajan, in his reply, does indeed speak of an 'extraordinarium munus'; but the epithet may be predicated just as naturally of the man as of the duty.

(ii) *Epp.* lxiii, lxiv, lxvii. Lycormas, an imperial freedman, wrote to Pliny asking that any embassy from the kingdom of Bosphorus to Rome should be detained till his arrival. Cuntz says that he would not have dared to make such a request unless he had some official and important position in the Bosphoran Kingdom;<sup>1</sup> and that he wished to acquire merit by being the earliest reporter of some urgent information. No embassy had come when *Epp.* lxiii, lxiv, were written, but only a courier who bore a covering letter to Pliny. Of this Pliny writes in *Ep.* lxiv 'Rex Sauromates scripsit mihi esse quaedam quae deberes quam maturissime scire.' Cuntz observes 'wie Sauromates sich Plinius gegenüber in dem Mantel des Geheimnisses hüllt'; and concludes that it cannot be any mere local turbulence, of which he would simply have informed Pliny, but some news about Parthia (what could it be?) which might urgently affect Trajan's plans. This explains why Lycormas, too, is so anxious to get in first with it.

Both King Sauromates, then, and Lycormas were in the secret in the spring of 112, and had some news to report to the Emperor which they kept secret from Pliny. Sauromates, indeed, was expected to send a *legatio* about it, and did, in fact, afterwards send a *legatus*, whom Pliny did not detain, as there seemed to be no good reason for doing so.<sup>2</sup> On the earlier occasion Pliny sent the two couriers on together, 'ut posses ex Lycormae et ex regis epistulis pariter cognoscere quae fortasse pariter scire deberes.' The last phrase hints at the only explanation which accounts for all the facts. There had been a dispute between Lycormas and the Bosphoran king. Lycormas heard that a *legatio* was going to complain of him (he evidently did not know about the *tabellarius*) and tried to stop it. Probably he had a guilty conscience. Pliny behaved sensibly: he seems to have guessed the truth. We can dispense with the Parthians and indeed the barbarian tribes (Hardy's explanation).

(iii) *Ep.* lxxiv. This introduces one Callidromus, who declared 'servisse se aliquando Laberio Maximo captumque a Susago in Moesia et a Decebalo muneri missum Pacoro, Parthiae regi, pluribusque annis in ministerio eius fuisse, deinde fugisse atque ita in Nicomediam pervenisse.' Pliny adds that he has decided to send the man to Trajan, but has delayed to carry out his decision while he searched

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, however, did not comply, as appears from *Ep.* lxvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep.* lxvii.

for a Parthian gem of which the man declared that he had been robbed and which he thinks would have made him more interesting to the Emperor. Cuntz asks, why does Pliny apologise for the delay? Obviously, because he fears Trajan's reproach for dallying with an urgent matter, urgent because of the news the man might have brought about the Parthian court and army, and because this proof of alliance between Pacorus and the Roman national enemy, Decebalus, would enable Trajan to justify his projected invasion at home and foster enthusiasm for the war. Is all this obvious? Whatever be thought of the Younger Pliny (and Cuntz supposes that he was the man whom Trajan, bruising his mind with tales of Alexander, sent out to blaze his trail for conquest), it can hardly be credible that he held back the bearer of this vital information while he embarked on a methodical police hunt for one engraved gem bearing a portrait of Pacorus in robes. In fact, this passage, an almost universal reference among general writers, tells us absolutely nothing about the Parthian war, though it contains interesting information on other topics. That Decebalus tried to secure an alliance with Pacorus is very likely; but there is no evidence in this letter that he succeeded.

(iv) *Epp.* xcii, xciii. Date, the end of 112. Pliny consults Trajan about the establishment of an *eranus* at Amisus. He begins 'Amisenorum civitas libera et foederata beneficio indulgentiae tuae legibus suis utitur.' Trajan replies 'Amisenos, quorum libellum epistulae tuae iunxeras, si legibus istorum, quibus de officio foederis utuntur, concessum est eranum habere, possumus quo minus habeant non impedire, eo facilius, si tali conlatione non ad turbas et ad illicitos coetus sed ad sustinendam tenuiorum inopiam utuntur. In ceteris civitatibus, quae nostro iure obstrictae sunt, res huius modi prohibenda est.' Now this is the only notice of a *foedus* at Amisus. The elder Pliny (*N.H.* vi, 7) calls it *liberum*. He names no *civitates foederatae* in the Orient (though he knew the difference, *N.H.* iii, 7), it is usually supposed by oversight. Cuntz argues that his only mistake is in the case of Mytilene (*N.H.* v, 139), and that Amisus was merely a *civitas libera* when Pliny the Elder wrote.<sup>1</sup> He then translates *foederata beneficio indulgentiae tuae* together and says that this proves that Trajan had granted a *foedus* to Amisus. And why? To secure their loyal assistance in maintaining communications and transporting food and even troops during the Parthian war. It might be questioned whether this is the means Trajan would normally have chosen to achieve this end; but, granted that it might be true, what evidence is there really for it in the words of either Pliny or Trajan?

Professor Cuntz's last argument is this. If the reasons published

<sup>1</sup> The means by which he proves that the other four cities in question were only *civitates liberae* when the Elder Pliny wrote may be accepted here, since our argument does not require their rejection.

In the case of the Aphrodisians, he admits they had a *foedus* in 35 B.C., but as Pliny calls them *liberi* they had lost it.

by Trajan for sending Pliny to Bithynia are the true ones,<sup>1</sup> why did he not send him after the trial of Julius Bassus had exposed the condition of the province in 104?<sup>2</sup> No, Trajan took no step until he had a blade of his own to forge; then he found a comfortable pretext ready to be used. The article concludes with the words 'damit werden wir es nun auch erklären, dass die direkt auf den Krieg bezüglichen Stücke, die in dem Briefwechsel gewiss nicht fehlten, sämtlich als ungeeignet für die Veröffentlichung weggelassen sind.' The direct references to the war were all censored from the correspondence afterwards. No flat denial can be given to this assumption.

Now that his particular points have been separately discussed, something may be said of Professor Cuntz's case in general. First, Pliny either knew or he did not know the real reason why he was being sent to Bithynia. If he did, and if it was the one that Cuntz supposes, we have to assume him guilty of crass negligence in holding up the escaped slave of *Ep.* lxxiv, and of inventing a singularly lightweight excuse. Moreover, there is even the less reason for Sauromates and Lycormas to have kept him in the dark. But if he did not know, what becomes of the direct references to the war (which Dr. Cuntz, I suspect, only put in as an afterthought on realising the weakness of his case), and how is it that Pliny is let into the secret of the extraordinary collection of corn which, *ex hypothesi*, was destined for the maws of Danube soldiers marching to the front? In fact, none of Dr. Cuntz's arguments can stand alone, and since they cannot stand together, his thesis must be regarded as unproven. There is no real reason to reject the view that Pliny was sent to Bithynia to cure just those diseases of the provincial and municipal administration which are mentioned throughout the letters as the cause for his mission, which had manifested themselves long before his coming, and which flourished, though less flagrantly, elsewhere. The scandal of Julius Bassus had been followed by the appointment of a man whom the provincials had themselves selected to prosecute Bassus on their behalf. This was not a success, but as the case against Varenus was dropped and Trajan was probably at that time still on the Danube, nothing was done immediately. It may be true that Trajan, when he turned his attention seriously to the eastern provinces,<sup>3</sup> realised the strategic importance of Bithynia in any Armenian war and determined that the province must be restored to an orderly and prosperous condition as soon as possible. That he had the intention of himself embarking on eastern conquest as soon as he could pick a quarrel with the Parthian King is an assumption for which there

<sup>1</sup> E.g. in *Ep.* xxxii.

<sup>2</sup> Or after that of Varenus in 106.

<sup>3</sup> According to Vogt (*Alexandrinische Münzen* i, 77), there was a rumour afoot in Alexandria in

108-9 that Trajan was intending to visit the city. Such an intention he might well have had, in view of his recent annexation (see below, p. 26) of Arabia, but Vogt's arguments, though ingenious, do not seem to me to prove it.

is in Pliny's letters no support whatever. Indeed, quite apart from the absence of direct references, the evidence of the letters seems rather to suggest that no special call on the province was envisaged in the near future.

2. *The situation under the Flavians.* But if the Bithynian letters contain no positive evidence of a plan for immediate aggression, this is not to say that the Roman government, and that even before the principate of Trajan, did not look forward to a further advance at Parthia's expense. It had been clearly seen by Corbulo, if not by armchair critics in Rome, that Armenia could not be permanently secured for a Roman nominee from a base in Syria; and that, if it were impossible to increase the available forces on the eastern frontier, it was better to allow Parthia to choose the king of a country which strategically was much more important to her than to Rome, reserving only to the Roman government the right of veto. It was on such terms that the agreement was concluded between him and Vologeses. Certain drawbacks, however, to this arrangement soon became apparent. Nero's government did indeed, immediately that the settlement was concluded, take steps to incorporate the kingdom of Pontus Polemoniacus in order to strengthen its control of the Euxine: but this province itself would need more military help for its efficient safeguard than the few soldiers of the procurator of Cappadocia could afford.<sup>1</sup> Worse than that, the new king, Tiridates, found himself quite unable, even with the assistance of Nero's engineers, to maintain order in his kingdom and to keep out the marauding Alans. In A.D. 72 these tribesmen invaded Armenia, and Tiridates was defeated and narrowly escaped capture at their hands. Josephus is misled by the old confusion about the Caspian Gates into transposing the order of the invasions of Armenia and Media, but the sequence of events is tolerably clear.<sup>2</sup> The main body, then, fell upon Media, but some of them or their allies even reached and ravaged the Roman provinces. Now it is relevant to remember that Cappadocia, a land which was still largely undeveloped, was a province in which the *princeps* had wide interests, and whose revenues were in part, at any rate, applied to meet the needs of the *aerarium militare*, a treasury which at no time seems to have had any very substantial balance.<sup>3</sup> An invasion, whether by Parthians or Alans, was not to be tolerated. Accordingly, Vespasian took the opportunity, in the same year, to plant two legions in the province, probably both at Melitene.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> What those intentions of Nero were which were cut short by his death cannot be determined; and since he did not carry them out, discussion of them is unprofitable.

<sup>2</sup> Jos. *Bell. Jud.* vii, 7. Cf. Hegesippus v, 51, 2 who follows Josephus, of whom his work is indeed a rough translation, but ascribes the invasion to A.D. 71.

<sup>3</sup> Otho's *nova iura* of Tac. *Hist.* i, 78 were probably in the nature of a financial concession to the provincials: but in any case they were 'ostentata magis quam mansura.'

<sup>4</sup> XII *Fulminata* may have been there since the autumn of 70: Jos. *B. J.* vii, i.

The well-known sentence of Suetonius sums this up succinctly in the words 'Cappadociae propter adsiduos barbarorum incursus legiones addidit consularemque rectorem imposuit pro eq. R.' This change, however, though it had its justification, was bound to excite the alarm of Parthia, since the Roman legions in Cappadocia became the virtual dictators of Armenia. The situation was perforce accepted by Vologeses, who, in 75, on the occasion presumably of further unrest among the Alans, proposed a joint expedition against them. Vespasian refused official participation, but he privately sent help to Roman allies beyond the Armenian frontier<sup>1</sup> and so no doubt strengthened Roman prestige in the country.

Meanwhile, west of the Euphrates the land was being systematically organised as a first-class military province. The details are easily accessible; and Cumont, for instance, concludes his sketch of the conditions with the words 'il n'est pas douteux que l'annexion de ces deux "états tampons" ait eu pour but de permettre la réalisation d'une oeuvre qui devait assurer la suprématie de Rome sur la Grande Arménie . . . Cette conquête préparée par les ingénieurs des Flaviens fut obtenue sans peine par les légions de Trajan.'<sup>2</sup> It is indeed reasonable to think that Vespasian, who believed in strong definite frontiers and cut-and-dried organisation, did look forward to a time when the untidy Armenian problem would be settled once for all by annexation: but the ground had not been prepared behind the line, even had there offered a good pretext for aggression, and even if the state of the imperial exchequer in the seventies had encouraged him to undertake so serious an enterprise.<sup>3</sup> Under his successors roads continued to be built behind the frontier, but Domitian chose to seek his triumphs elsewhere, and after 85 the Eastern question had to give way to more pressing dangers on the northern frontiers.<sup>4</sup> It was not until Trajan had finally solved the Dacian problem by annexing the country that he was free in 108 to turn his attention to the East; and it was not long before a situation arose which called upon him to decide, on this frontier also, between a policy of conquest and one of concession.

<sup>1</sup> *I.L.S.* 8795 (minor correction by A. Aminraschwili reported in *Berl. Phil. Woch.* xlviii, 838). The inscription does not say that a Roman force was permanently stationed here, only that it helped King Mithridates of Iberia to build some walls. To connect these operations with the trade route across the Caucasus mentioned by Strabo and Pliny is, I think, to allow undue importance to a route which there is no evidence to show was freely used at this time. (Cf. *Arrian Peripl.* 9, 5.)

<sup>2</sup> *Anatolian Studies presented to Sir W. Rumsay*, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup> The details of trouble on the Syrian frontier under the elder Trajan (*Plin. Pan.* 14, Dessau, *I.L.S.* 8970. *Suidas s.v. ἐπικλημα*) in 76 or 77 and its causes are equally conjectural. It is worth

bearing in mind that in 77-8 the procurator in Bithynia, a man of much military experience, seems to have enjoyed exceptional powers (*I.L.S.* 253, 9199. *B.M.C. Bithynia*, p. 104). Cumont, *Études Syriennes*, pp. 329-330, relies on two inscriptions from near Cyrrhus, together with *C.I.L.* iii, 192, 195, to show that legion VII *Claudia* came to Commagene as a temporary garrison in 72 and stayed to take part in Trajan's war. But it fought in the Dacian wars, and I think none of the inscriptions need be earlier than 114.

<sup>4</sup> Without better authority we cannot use the statement in Moses Chorenensis that Ardaches of Armenia had defeated Domitian's troops (see p. 9, n. 8; 17, n. 4), or that of *Suidas* under the heading *Δομετιανός*.

3. *The action of Trajan.* Dio's narrative,<sup>1</sup> combined with the specific excerpts of Arrian in Suidas, make it fairly plain what these circumstances were. We do not know when Tiridates died ; but as he was a young man in 66 and survived the Alan invasion, we may at least prolong his reign well into that of Pacorus. His legitimate successor would be the second son of the reigning Parthian monarch, that is to say, Axidares : and, preoccupied as the Romans were on other frontiers, there is little reason to doubt that Domitian or, more probably, Trajan accepted the nomination in accordance with the terms of the Neronian agreement. Osroes, when he sent an embassy to Trajan, maintained that Axidares had proved unsatisfactory both to the Romans and to the Parthians, and this, no doubt, means that (at least according to Osroes) he had failed to preserve order in his kingdom. This was used as an excuse by Osroes for deposing him and nominating in his place his elder brother Parthamasiris. What other motives of internal policy Osroes may have had for such a course we cannot tell ; but a possible one has been suggested above (p. 13). Parthamasiris invaded Armenia and chaos ensued. It is really immaterial whether Axidares actually appealed to Rome or not, but it is natural to suppose that he did.<sup>2</sup> In any case, Trajan could not leave matters as they stood. Rival kings were fighting in a Roman protectorate, and the new king of Parthia had heralded his accession by a gross flouting of the Roman prerogative.

When news came that the Emperor was actually planning a campaign Osroes changed his tune. Had he been able to present Trajan with a *fait accompli* in Armenia, there would have been no embassy to Athens ; but his nominee had gained only a partial success and, in case of war, the attitude of many of his other vassals was far from certain. Trajan, for his part, was still in some doubt about the future. Arrian wrote οὐκ ἀπείρατον αὐτῷ ἔδοξεν ἐκλιπεῖν εἰ πῃ Ὀσρόης γνωσιμαχῆσας ὑποδύσεται τοῖς ἐκ Ῥωμαίων τε καὶ αὐτοῦ ξὺν δίκῃ ἀξιουμένοις. There is no reason to doubt the implications of his answer to the embassy given in Dio ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ἐς τὴν Συρίαν ἔλθῃ, πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσει. Trajan had not been in the East since 77, and he did not wish to commit himself until he had personally reviewed the situation. Such reservations would be characteristic. But we shall not be far wrong in guessing that one of the terms upon

<sup>1</sup> Exc. Ug. 51, 52.

<sup>2</sup> Trajan's pronouncement about Parthamasiris (Suidas from Arrian, *Parthica* s.v. γνῶσις) shows that after the invasion of Armenia, Axidares was still regarded as the responsible king of the country, but indicates also what was to become of him. (Cf. Suidas s.v. ἀμφίλογον). Parthamasiris did not keep his first appointment with Trajan—probably at Satala where his humiliation was to have encouraged the other vassals there assembled—(Suidas s.v. χρόναι). His excuse was as follows : τῆς δὲ τριβῆς τὰ αἴτια οὐ δυνατὸς γενέσθαι εὐθέϊαν παρὰ βασιλέα

ἐλάσαι τῷ δεῖσαι τὰς φυλακὰς τὰς Ἀξιδάρου καὶ περιελθεῖν ἐν κύκλῳ καὶ οὕτω διὰ μακροῦ ἀφικέσθαι. Clearly then Axidares was still holding some part of Armenia, and considering where Parthamasiris came from and where he could not get to, this was probably the north-western district. If Trajan took measures to secure Arsamosata, it may be that Parthamasiris' supporters were known to be active in that part. It seems likely that he had dislodged Axidares from the capital, Artaxata, and from the Araxes valley.



which he was prepared to make peace with Osroes was the surrender to Rome of all Parthian rights over Armenia and its incorporation as a Roman province. This is certainly suggested by his subsequent answer to Parthamasiris,<sup>1</sup> and it is borne out by what we know of his policy at this time. Trajan began his principate with the idea of combining firmness with concession. In pursuance of this policy, when he had humbled Decebalus in 102 and freed Rome from the stigma and, equally important, the financial strain of Domitian's annual tribute, he left him the possession of his kingdom. He was, however, soon disillusioned, and in 105 was forced to do his work all over again and to adopt in the end the policy of annexation which he had rejected in 102. From this time we may date a change in his ideas; in 106, probably on the death of the king of Nabat, he instructed the governor of Syria to annex that kingdom.<sup>2</sup> Now he was faced with a set of circumstances which, though spread over a longer period of time, must have struck him as parallel to his own experiences in Dacia. The harvest of Nero's concession was being reaped in the contumely of Osroes. Moreover, though it is no doubt true that Osroes in Armenia was a far less dangerous enemy than Decebalus on the Danube, yet he was a new monarch, about whose intentions and capacity very little was known at Rome save that he had succeeded to the Great Kingship, if not by illegal means, at any rate, contrary to expectation. Secondly, Rome depended on her prestige in Armenia to secure quiet among those Black Sea tribes which were not under her direct supervision; and it had already been shown that inefficient government in Armenia laid even the Roman provinces open to barbarian raids. Finally, as Trajan's own words imply, Armenia was still thought of at Rome as a Roman possession whose invasion by a Parthian army under Parthamasiris could only be regarded as an act of war. Trajan could not help knowing something of what this possession had cost Rome in men, money and anxiety since the days of Pompey; and if, with all these considerations before him, he made up his mind to secure the possession of Armenia permanently by annexation—the only solution of the problem which had not been tried and found wanting—his imperialism cannot be too rudely dismissed as unwarrantable.

Had it been possible for Trajan to stop at the conquest of Armenia, the final results of his campaign would have been very different: and the existence of a permanent threat from the Romans in that province would probably have hastened the dissolution of the Arsacid

<sup>1</sup> Exc. Ug. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Other motives *may* have influenced this decision, such as a desire to improve trade relations with India by more efficient control of the Red Sea. Trajan put a fleet there (see above, p. 15),

and built a first-class road to it through the Nabataean territory. He also repaired and enlarged the canal between the Nile and the Red Sea from Babylon on the Nile to Clysma. One result of this may have been the Indian embassy in the following year.

régime. But circumstances combined to lead him on. Before peace could be concluded with Osroes, it was necessary to meet him or some responsible envoy, and none such appeared, since the Great King was determined to resist if he could, and for the present was fully occupied with his own rebellious vassals. But, on the other hand, most of the princes of Mesopotamia, seeing that they were left powerless to make effective resistance, sent submissive messages to Trajan ; and in the case of Mebarsapes, who by invading Armenia had courted retribution, the ease with which his forces were defeated showed how little serious opposition was to be expected in that quarter. Moreover, we need not doubt that Trajan wished to teach Osroes a lesson for the future and still hoped for an opportunity to come to blows with him before making a settlement. Accordingly he descended into Mesopotamia. Historians record the conquest of Mesopotamia with often a note that it seems to have been easily won ; but in fact it was hardly a ' conquest ' so much as a triumphal progress, for reasons which have been set out elsewhere in this article (pp. 11-13). Mebarsapes retired beyond the Tigris ; but of Osroes there was still no sign.

If it was at this point that Trajan decided to annex Mesopotamia, then he here made his first mistake. But if his intention was, as in Dacia, to strike at Osroes' capital, he could not help maintaining a garrison in the already occupied country while he prepared for a second campaign in which he quite clearly expected opposition. In the event, however, the opposition was only of a secondary nature, and Osroes escaped unhurt into the Bakhtiari mountains. What was Trajan now to do ? Was he to pursue further, or was he to withdraw and leave his unbeaten enemy to return to his former position. In the light of subsequent events we can see that the second would have been the wiser course ; but to Trajan it seemed an unsatisfactory one, leaving the matter unsettled and a certainty of future conflict ahead. Accordingly he adopted neither alternative but determined to annex the territory he had overrun and to advance the Roman frontier permanently to the edges of the Iranian plateau. Other considerations may now, and now only, have shaped his mind towards this decision. When Mommsen offers as a reason for his aggression the commercial value of Mesopotamia and the fact that its half-Greek population offered a much more favourable soil for Roman provincial organisation than the wholly oriental Armenia, he is emphasising reasons which only became operative, if at all, in Trajan's mind when he entered Mesopotamia. It is indeed true that much of the conquered land was fertile and capable of development, for instance Osrhoene, the whole of the Tur Abdin, and the land between the Zabs (though the country between the Khabur river and the Tigris was already for the most part a desert). It is also true that dues could be collected on the caravans which might help to recoup

the charges of provincial government. But, if Trajan knew these things, he also knew that the richest part of the oriental traffic already went from India and even from the Persian Gulf round by sea. It may, therefore, have been with the idea of fostering the passage of trade through his new province that he made a voyage to visit the friendly king of Characene, who agreed to pay tribute, a payment which no doubt he hoped to outweigh by the advantages of trade with the Roman empire.<sup>1</sup> While, therefore, there is no need or reason to impute Trajan's invasion of Parthia to an original desire for the benefits of an extended commerce, we can see how the economic possibilities of his conquest entered his mind when the continued absence of Osroes brought him face to face with an unexpected problem and when he reflected on the serious expense entailed by his protracted campaigns.

These reflections, however, bore a bitter fruit in the revolt. The new provinces had been conquered in war at great expense and, as such, besides taxes—which they had paid to Osroes—they must pay an indemnity. But the inhabitants who for the most part had merely acquiesced in Trajan's advance and had made no attempt to defend themselves, and some of whom perhaps remembered that they were Greeks of Alexander's empire and belonged to an older race of conquerors than the Romans, were ready upon these terms to prefer the old loose overlordship of the Parthian King to the efficient impositions of Rome: and when a Parthian army suddenly appeared in the north, the whole of Mesopotamia and Adiabene burst out into a sympathetic revolt. It is often implied that Trajan's campaigns ended in disaster. This is not the truth. The revolt was crushed, and Trajan proceeded to crown his own nominee and a member of the Parthian royal house as King of Parthia, which there is no ground for thinking he had ever intended to annex. If Hadrian afterwards abandoned the new provinces, it was because the situation demanded that he should himself return to Rome and because, for his own reasons, he dared not leave any single army commander behind him with sufficient forces united under his command to carry out the full pacification and organisation which was still necessary there.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In fact, when the Romans withdrew, the trade returned to its old channels, though a change took place in the third century. (See note below.)

<sup>2</sup> Warmington, *Commerce between the Roman Empire and India*, pp. 91–100, panegyrises Trajan as a 'second Augustus in Roman commerce' and either explicitly or implicitly ascribes a commercial motive for all he did and some things which he may have done in the East. The arguments do not seem to me convincing, but it is impossible here to deal with them piecemeal. Vespasian's reorganisation of Cappadocia is quoted as the first of a series of steps which were 'begun already in A.D. 100 or thereabouts by Trajan' in order to link up the eastern boundaries of the Empire commercially and

otherwise (p. 92); this seems to illustrate not unfairly the nature of the evidence for such a view. Trajan is said to have formed a scheme ('which had been suggested at the imperial court for some time') for the invasion of India. As evidence of this the remark of Plutarch (*Pomp.* 70) that 'given leaders such as Pompey and Caesar acting conjointly, India could not have resisted 70,000 Roman troops' is adduced, but, to say the least, does not seem to be worth very much. As for Martial's epigram quoted (xii, 8, 8–10), it refers to Trajan's accession and contains no idea of foreign conquest but is a rhetorical way of saying what a good man Trajan was, while Statius' lines (*Silvae*, iv, 1, 40–42), if they are evidence of anything, are evidence for

‘The praises of Alexander,’ wrote Gibbon, ‘transmitted by a succession of poets and historians, had kindled a dangerous emulation in the mind of Trajan’; and he is inclined to judge Trajan’s aims principally by this criterion. Herein he follows his favourite Julian, who himself perhaps followed Dio, but made Trajan declare that he only took up arms upon provocation. Ambition is indeed the natural explanation of any aggressive war for which there is no immediately obvious motive: but I have tried to emphasise—what has, of course, been recognised before—that it is unnecessary, indeed erroneous, to treat this as a primary cause. The recollection of Alexander was certainly present to Trajan both now and earlier in his reign, with polite writers to point the parallel, and no doubt he was by nature open to that last infirmity of noble mind.<sup>1</sup> But I believe the right view to be that it was only in the course of the campaigns and as a result of special circumstances that he allowed his ambition to outrun his judgment. His less efficient successors, and even Napoleon, might have done well to ponder the lessons of his campaign, lessons indeed which every imperial race is forced to learn. In this particular case he was induced to undertake a conquest which might have been permanently secured had he lived and of which the most valid criticism is probably that it would have hastened the ultimate division of the empire.

#### ADDENDUM.

Since the foregoing article was written, a new book has appeared, which merits notice here—*Die römische Kaisergeschichte bei Malalas*, by Alexander Schenk, Graf von Stauffenberg (Stuttgart, 1931). In the course of his commentary von Stauffenberg finds himself confronted by the problems aroused by Malalas’ account of the Parthian wars, and pp. 261–286 are devoted to their solution. It is impossible here to discuss his complicated arguments in full detail:

court flattery of the irresponsible ambitions of Domitian. That Trajan was forced to return from the Persian Gulf by the news of the revolt is not the case. That ‘the general results of Trajan’s visit to the East are reflected in the rise of Palmyra, in the occurrence of three gold coins (of Domitian, Trajan and Sabina) together with coins of Kushan kings at Jellalabad, and above all in the detailed information of North-West India contained in Ptolemy’ (p. 95) seems to me to be unproven. The position of Palmyra had indeed made it important since early imperial days: but its wealth surely belongs to a later time; and the second century inscriptions are singularly weak in evidence that any traffic of value from the Far East was passing through the town. If Trajan’s wars had, as the author in the previous sentence declares, for a time closed to Romans the silk route through Parthia (thus assisting a *rapprochement* between Romans and Kushans), Palmyra must have suffered. The coins

by themselves are pale reflectors: and it is hard to see what the war that brought Trajan to the East, which served rather to close the avenues of intercourse and information, can have contributed to the work of Ptolemy. Ptolemy (and the coins, but cp. p. 300) owed more to the improved relations between India and Alexandria, for which Trajan was in part responsible (cf. p. 299).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. some remarks of de la Berge *Essai*, pp. 151–5, which are worth reading. His account of the Parthian wars is still the best available. The prominence in the later stages of the war of Lusius Quietus, the first of those barbarian adventurers who served the empire well upon occasion, to do it greater harm in the long run, should not be overlooked. Themistius even says that Trajan had designed him as his successor, and we can easily see how in 116 he may have appeared the only bulwark in a sea of incompetence.

it must suffice to notice the main points now, and reserve the possibility of further criticism against a future occasion.

Von Stauffenberg may be described as a follower of von Gutschmid in his attempt to do what Mommsen declared to be impossible, to recognise in the version of Malalas a substantially true account of the facts; but he goes much further than his predecessor. Before proceeding to particulars it is right to quote the sentence with which he concludes this part of his commentary. 'Zusammenfassend darf über die malalianische Darstellung des traianischen Partherzuges bemerkt werden, dass nach Beseitigung weniger Missverständnisse zu der dürftigen wesentlich durch Dio Cassius vertretenen Ueberlieferung über einen der grössten Herrscher der römischen Kaiserzeit hier eine neue Quelle mit dem Anspruch auf gleiche Beachtung teils bestätigend teils berichtigend und ergänzend hinzutritt, und dass man von jetzt ab für eine nachschaffende Neugestaltung des kaiserlichen Bildes an diesem oft so bedenklichen und gleichgültigen späten Chronisten vorbeizugehen nicht mehr das Recht hat' (pp. 285-6).

The narrative of Malalas, so far as it concerns the Parthian wars, falls into three divisions. The first of these, describing a Persian invasion of Euphratesia, the willing surrender of Antioch to the Persians and its revolt from them on the approach of Trajan, concludes with the words ἅτινα Δομνῖνος ὁ χρονογράφος συνεγράψατο. The second story, which is separated from the first by a very doubtful anecdote about Christian persecutions, closes with τὸν δὲ πόλεμον καὶ τὴν κατὰ Περσῶν νίκην τοῦ θειοτάτου Τραϊανοῦ ὁ σοφώτατος Ἀρειανὸς ὁ χρονογράφος ἐξέθετο ἱστορήσας καὶ συγγραψάμενος πάντα ἀκριβῶς. This in its turn is followed by some demonstrably untrue statements about individual acts of imperial administration by Trajan, and by the mention of the earthquake.

Now the natural inference here is that Malalas is drawing his information about the wars from two distinct sources. Von Stauffenberg, however, points out with reason that we need not think that Malalas drew the part of his story which he ascribes to Arrian directly from that source; and that, if we ask whence he did draw it, we must conclude that he drew it, with the rest, from Domninus. 'Da nun von diesem' (the Domninus story) 'das folgende angeblich aus Arrian stammende Stück stilistisch wie inhaltlich unmöglich getrennt werden kann, muss Domninus für den Gesamtabschnitt als Quelle verantwortlich gemacht werden, so dass die Zitierung Arrians ohne Zweifel auf ihn schon zurückgeht' (p. 273). It is by no means certain, so far as I can see, that the stylistic parallels prove this point, and not merely that Malalas wrote both passages; for it must be remembered that we only know Domninus through Malalas. Domninus was indeed a principal source of information for the Parthian campaigns both of Trajan and of other emperors, but not the only one,

as we learn from the narrative of Valerian's relations with Sapor. The arguments of Patzig against Bourier (to which von Stauffenberg himself refers) seem decisive against a close limitation of the sources which Malalas handled personally.<sup>1</sup>

But even granted, what may indeed be true, that the whole of Malalas' narrative is derived from Domninus, we are not thereby compelled to extend over the whole of it the mantle of Arrian's authority. This is, however, what von Stauffenberg wishes to do. He divides the Domninus story into two parts—(a) the invasion of Euphratesia, leading up to Trajan's arrival in the east, and (b) the betrayal of Antioch to the Persians and its subsequent recovery. He thinks that (a) may be traced back to an origin in Arrian; as for (b), he supposes that Domninus took it from the archives of Antioch, but that, apart from its historical probability, it is so closely related to the genuine excerpts from Arrian that it must—in part, at any rate—be itself accepted. 'Obwohl man aber das Domninusexzerpt aus Arrian streng von diesem Domninusexzerpt—wohl aus der Stadtchronik—unterscheiden muss, sind die Angaben doch so zusammenhängend, dass man nicht nur umlaufende Legenden, sondern wirkliche Vorgänge voraussetzen muss' (p. 283, n. 49).

These brief remarks may suffice to illustrate how conjectural must be any attempt at present to prove the legitimacy of Malalas' descent from Arrian by internal evidence. It would, however, be uncritical to suppose that Malalas or Domninus simply made up the whole story and added the name of Arrian to give it verisimilitude. On pp. 16-19 above, in commenting on the history of the revolt, I accepted provisionally the last part of the story—which Malalas appears especially to associate with Arrian's name—on the ground that there is nothing at present in our other sources to contradict and even something to confirm it. As for the Domninus story, I gave some of the reasons for rejecting that, but I did not think it necessary to explain it away. It remains now to see how von Stauffenberg justifies it by reference to the criterion of external sources.

The invaders of Euphratesia, according to this story, were Meerdotes and his son Sanatruces, aided by Parthemaspatēs, son of Osroes, king of Armenia. Von Stauffenberg thinks that Parthemaspatēs is a mistake for Parthamasiris, and he compares with this the contrary error of 'Spartianus.'<sup>2</sup> Knowing that Parthemaspatēs was the son of Osroes and knowing, too, that the invader was a king of Armenia, the author made Osroes also into an Armenian king. As

<sup>1</sup> Bourier, *Über die Quellen der ersten vierzehn Bücher des Jo. Malalas* (Munich 1899-1900): Patzig in *Byz. Zeitsch.* 1901 sums up with the sentence 'Nach Bourier hat Malalas in den ersten 14 Büchern im ganzen nur Timotheos, Domninos und Nestorianos benutzt; ich dagegen halte Domninos und Nestorianos für identisch und

glaube, dass von Malalas alle diejenigen Quellen, die er im Prooemium aufzählt, wirklich benutzt worden sind' (p. 610). Cf. also the analysis of Malalas' account by von Gutschmid in Dierauer's *Beiträge zu einer kritischen Geschichte Trajans* pp. 154-158.

<sup>2</sup> S.H.A., *Hadrian*, 5.



for Meerdotes, the shadow of that coin-legendary monarch, Mithradates IV, is again called forth for him,<sup>1</sup> and a kingdom found for him in northern Mesopotamia.<sup>2</sup> Sanatruces is the man who reappears in the revolt. So much, then, for the personalities. Now, if Trajan's object had merely been, according to the pretext for the war given in Dio, to arrange matters in Armenia, why did he not, like the troops summoned for the campaign, take the shortest route to that country instead of fetching a circuit to Antioch? The answer, according to von Stauffenberg, is that the Armenian problem had to yield place to the much more urgent one of driving the Parthians out of the very province of Syria, where they were masters of the eastern districts and where Antioch itself had voluntarily gone over to them. And to the further question, how comes it that Dio knows nothing of all this, the answer is that, granted he drew on Arrian, his account is only a very much abridged version and that, furthermore, it was admittedly his aim to show that the war was merely fought by Trajan *δόξης ἐπιθυμία*—in other words, that Dio deliberately suggested the false by suppressing the true. Von Gutschmid, indeed, tried to refer the story about Antioch to an actual event in the time of Sapor I, supposing that the Emperor was merely designated as *Καῖσαρ* and that, especially in view of the disastrous general history of that period, the whole anecdote was afterwards transferred to Trajan:<sup>3</sup> but von Stauffenberg will not have this, believing that the story must be accepted as in the main true and cannot be justly parted from its context—'die Folge jedoch, in welcher das Ereignis mit der vorausgehenden Ankunft in Seleukeia und dem nachfolgenden Einzug in Antiochien eng zusammenhängt, zwingt uns, einen wahren Kern wenigstens in dem Berichte anzunehmen' (p. 282). There is yet a further point. Dio says that Trajan took Samosata without a battle. Von Stauffenberg comments 'Demgemäss postuliert auch er ohne weiteres eine Besetzung römischen Gebietes durch die Parther' (p. 279). In fact, Dio has foolishly provided us with the means of exposing his own *suggestio falsi*, and we need not do his text the violence of altering Samosata into Arsamosata.

I have endeavoured to put the case as fairly as can be done in a limited space; but, ingeniously as it is argued, I do not think that it is possible to accept it. Von Stauffenberg does not explain how the Syrian legions—even granted that the capture of Samosata showed they were disorganised—can have permitted a Parthian force of less than 3,000 men (p. 281) to have occupied Antioch. He does not explain how Trajan at Athens can even have listened to an embassy from a king who was at that moment in possession of the capital of Syria,

<sup>1</sup> The older date for this king is preferred and the arguments of Wroth (B.M.C. *Parthia*, pp. lix, lx) are ignored. These are not, indeed, absolutely conclusive; but so much mystery surrounds these

coins that they cannot be admitted as evidence to corroborate anything.

<sup>2</sup> The locality is not further specified.

<sup>3</sup> *Ap. Dierauer, o.c.* p. 157.

still less the implications of Suidas' entry under *γνωσιμαχῆσαι*. Is it credible that Parthamasiris, who, according to von Stauffenberg's own correction, was one of the leaders of the invading army, should have been given a chance by Trajan to advance in public his claim to the Armenian crown?<sup>1</sup> Is it probable that Abgarus would have been retained by Osroes in his kingdom if he had refused to take part in the invasion of the territory neighbouring his own, or confirmed by Trajan in his turn if he had taken such part? His attitude and subsequent history seem only explicable on the hypothesis that there had been no actual clash between Roman and Parthian forces before Trajan's arrival. The reasons why Trajan should in any case first go to Antioch seem too plain to need detailed exposition. I have quoted von Gutschmid's opinion, expressed many years ago, that such part of Malalas' narrative as does descend from Arrian belongs to the period of the revolt, and that the story of the Persians in Antioch is an interpolation from a later time. The 'Euphratesian' invasion which leads up to the latter story might be an attempt by some historian to reconcile and combine the two narratives; it is noticeable that the same Parthian leaders appear in both (a fact which it gives von Stauffenberg considerable trouble to explain), and that the sanction of Arrian is in fact not called upon for the story of the invasion. Even if we were to accept the story as having a kernel of fact, I should think it could, with greater plausibility, also be associated with the revolt. At such a time, with the legions widely dispersed and much of the remaining Syrian garrison away in Egypt, an invasion of 'Euphratesia' is by no means out of the question, and even the defection of Antioch is conceivable. The identity of the generals with those who took part in the subsequent events becomes explicable, and it is then unnecessary to replace Parthamaspatēs by Parthamasiris. Finally, it is open to us to suppose that here, as elsewhere, the deeds of Lusius Quietus, to whom would fall the task of recovering Antioch and Euphratesia, were subsequently attributed to his emperor.<sup>2</sup> I had dismissed this theory as too conjectural to be worth putting forward; but I should prefer it to the view advanced by von Stauffen-

<sup>1</sup> Von Stauffenberg has a very complicated theory of the Armenian antecedents of the war. According to this, Osroes first broke his contract with Rome by appointing Axidares king of Armenia, but he deceived himself in thinking that his nephew would be the 'ergebener Vollstrecker seiner Wünsche,' the 'in allen Dingen gehorsame Kreatur' that he desired (p. 263). In fact, in the diplomatic intrigues which followed his action (?), Axidares declared for Trajan and received a provisional recognition. Thereupon Osroes deposed him in favour of his brother Parthamasiris, who obediently—but without first effectively ousting Axidares—joined the Euphratesian expedition, but did not therefore, it seems, give up hope that Trajan would ultimately recognise his claims in Armenia. On Trajan's approach Osroes sent an embassy to Athens,

but after such preliminaries it is hard to imagine that his envoys had much confidence in the plea which Dio says they advanced. Axidares also sent envoys to Athens. Trajan concluded a provisional alliance with him (which he afterwards repudiated); and he had already made some headway in Armenia before Trajan arrived there. The reason why Dio does not relate these facts is the same as that already given. I can here only refer to the alternative version which I have adopted in the above article: it must suffice to say that this very elaborate reconstruction seems to turn on a less probable interpretation of Dio Exc. Ug. 51 and a wish to find a place for the invasion of Euphratesia.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 18.

berg. It does seem to me, indeed, to be absolutely impossible to postulate a fall of Antioch before Trajan's arrival in the East : and while, if that fall be postponed till the time of the revolt, it is not possible to deny it conclusively, it still seems to me unsound to accept more of Malalas' narrative than I have done on pp. 16-19 above. This is enough to explain the transference or fabrication of the rest, it is all that is ascribed by Malalas himself to Arrian, and it is all that is not in more or less violent contradiction with the evidence of better authorities about the war.

There still remains a point of chronology to notice. Malalas says that Trajan entered Antioch μηνι αὐδυναίῳ τῷ καὶ ἰανουαρίῳ ἐβδόμῃ, ἡμέρᾳ ε', and that the earthquake took place μηνι ἀπελλαίῳ τῷ καὶ δεκεμβρίῳ ιγ', ἡμέρᾳ α', ἔτους χρηματίζοντος ρξδ' κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς Ἀντιοχεῖς. These dates, according to the ordinary reckoning, are January 7, 114, which was not a Thursday, and December 13, 115, which was not a Sunday. The attempt of von Gutschmid to save Malalas' credit by rectifying these dates has already been noticed (above, p. 4) ; but von Stauffenberg holds a different view. He claims to show that the Tyrian calendar was in use at Antioch at this time. Now according to the *Hemerologia* published and discussed by Kubitschek,<sup>1</sup> Apellaios 13 in the Tyrian calendar coincides with December 30 ; and December 30, 115, was in fact a Sunday. Thus we see that Malalas is right again, and other possible objections to this date can be dismissed without more ado. 'Dass Pedo, ein Konsul des Jahres 115, bei dieser Katastrophe ums Leben kam, steht dem Ansatz nicht entgegen, und der armenische sowohl wie der mesopotamische Feldzug können sehr wohl die Jahre 114 und 115 ausgefüllt haben.' (p. 277). But we have still to reckon with the entry into Antioch. According to the Tyrian calendar, Audynaïos 7 coincides with January 23 ; but January 23, 114, was not a Thursday but a Monday, so that while Malalas passes one test he breaks down on the other, and we are forced in this case to conclude 'dass der richtige Wochentag schon in den Stadtannalen gestanden hat, und dass der falsche erst auf Grund eines Schreibfehlers oder sonstigen Irrtums zustande gekommen ist' (p. 284). But what ground is there for thinking that the Tyrian calendar was in use at Antioch instead of the normal one, which incidentally the *Hemerologia* themselves associate with the city ? None, apparently, except this passage. 'Dass der tyrische Kalender auch für Antiochien gilt . . . geht aus unserer Stelle unzweifelhaft hervor', writes von Stauffenberg (p. 276) ; and on the following page he unhesitatingly uses his deduction to prove the validity of his premise. If it be asked how the author ever hit on this partial coincidence, he himself supplies the answer (pp. 108-111). According to Malalas, it was on Artemisius 20, 47 B.C., that Caesar's grant of


<sup>1</sup> *Denkschr. d. Wien. Akad.* lvii, 3 Abt.

*libertas* to Antioch was proclaimed in the city.<sup>1</sup> This, according to the lunar calendar then in force at Antioch, was the equivalent of April 13 (Julian). According to the current unreformed Roman reckoning, it was June 25. Now the battle of Pharsalus, the era of which was adopted in Antioch as elsewhere in the East, was fought on August 9, 48 B.C. If, when the Julian calendar was introduced in 45, the reckoning were made to find the Julian date of that battle, the answer would be that Pharsalus was fought on June 7 (Julian).<sup>2</sup> But June 7, the amended date of Pharsalus, coincides, according to the Tyrian calendar, with Artemisius 20. When, therefore, the people at Antioch were forced at a later date to adopt a solar calendar, they naturally adopted the one which, by a fortunate chance, equated the anniversary of their freedom (by old reckoning) with the anniversary of Pharsalus (by new reckoning); or alternatively they invented the calendar which was subsequently called Tyrian.<sup>3</sup> Von Stauffenberg rejects this view as founded upon an ingenious coincidence from which no conclusions can be drawn; but, while I agree with him in finding von Domaszewski's theory hard to accept, though easy to admire, I cannot see that he has advanced any better evidence to prove his own point, though I am not disposed to argue that further evidence might not be found. Moreover, even if it were to be proved that the Tyrian calendar actually was in use at Antioch, and thus that one of Malalas' two dates was at least consistent with itself, I do not think that the proof of this point could upset the other evidence for the date of the earthquake collected in this article.

<sup>1</sup> ix, 216.

<sup>2</sup> The victory, however, continued to be celebrated on August 9. Cf. *Fasti Amit. Antict. Maff. Allif.* in *C.I.L.* I<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> The theory was advanced by von Domaszewski in *Abhandlungen zur römischen Religion*, p. 206 ff.



SKETCH-MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN. (See p. i ff.)